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TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE 
NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Abstract: Native American Indian tribal sovereign immunity is a judicially cre-
ated doctrine that provides immunity from suit for Indian tribes in the United 
States. Although judicially created, the United States’ courts have repeatedly em-
phasized that only Congress has the power to limit Indian tribal immunity. As a 
result, tribal sovereign immunity has become a seemingly boundless means of 
avoiding lawsuits and liability. Moreover, tribal sovereign immunity has created 
a gap in the United States judicial system in which an individual may avoid cer-
tain lawsuits by entering into a favorable transaction with an Indian tribe. In 
these transactions, an individual may transfer property rights to an Indian tribe, 
thereby allowing the tribe to assert immunity in a suit concerning the property. 
Without congressional action, tribal sovereign immunity and the judicial loop-
hole it creates will continue to be exploited. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, the pharmaceutical company Allergan made an un-
precedented deal with a Native American Indian tribe.1 Allergan negotiated to 
transfer ownership of its six patents for the dry-eye drug Restasis to the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe in upstate New York.2 As part of the transaction, Allergan 
paid the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe a large sum of money, and in return, Allergan 
received an exclusive license to practice the patents.3 When the logistics of this 
deal were explained in court, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas stated that it believed Allergan only entered into the deal be-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Adam Davidson, Patently Odd, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 2017, at 36 (describing the deal 
made between Allergan and the St. Regis Mohawk tribe); Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Pa-
tent? Give It to a Native American Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/08/health/allergan-patent-tribe.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3SV2-2F9X] (describing the Al-
lergan deal as “surprising” and “unusual”). Allergan is a global pharmaceutical company that develops 
and manufactures pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biologic devices. Company Profile, ALLER-
GAN, https://www.allergan.com/about/company-profile.aspx [http://perma.cc/7JP8-Z4BP]. The St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe is a federally-recognized Native American Indian tribe located in New York. 
About the Tribe, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/about-the-tribe [http://
perma.cc/X3UA-BZ7U]. 
 2 See Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (stating that the St. Regis Mohawk tribe agreed to let Allergan 
practice the patents exclusively); Thomas, supra note 1 (describing how Allergan sold six patents to 
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe). Restasis is a pharmaceutical eye drop that helps the eye produce tears in 
order to prevent dry eye. RESTASIS, https://www.restasis.com/ [http://perma.cc/Y6JW-X7LB]. 
 3 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (providing background on Allergan’s deal to sell the Restasis patents to the 
St. Regis Mohawk Tribe with an exclusive license back to Allergan); see also Thomas, supra note 1 
(providing details of the transaction between Allergan and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe of New York). 
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cause Allergan believed the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe could assert tribal sover-
eign immunity and avoid an inter partes review (IPR) at the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board.4 Although this specific transaction focuses on the transfer of 
intellectual property and an administrative proceeding, it highlights a more 
extensive problem.5 Tribal sovereign immunity can provide an effective means 
by which both Native Indian tribes and non-tribe members can avoid a lawsuit 
and escape liability, even when there is clear evidence of culpability or wrong-
doing.6 
The judicially created doctrine of Indian sovereign immunity dates back 
to the late 1700s as the United States government entered into treaties with the 
Indian tribes, implicitly recognizing the tribes as sovereign entities.7 With few 
limits placed on Indian sovereign immunity since its creation, there seem to be 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (stating that Allergan transferred the patents seemingly to 
exploit the tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to avoid an inter partes review); see Santa Clara Pueb-
lo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (stating that Indian tribes are sovereign entities, granting them 
sovereign immunity from suit); Thomas, supra note 1 (describing the Allergan deal as “perhaps the 
most novel attempt to avoid a patent-review process” at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). The Al-
lergan case only concerned whether the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe should be joined as a party to a sepa-
rate civil suit and therefore did not address the exploitation of the tribe’s sovereign immunity issue. 
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4. Inter partes review (IPR) is a proceeding that occurs in front of 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board that allows an individual to challenge the validity of a patent. See 
Gene Quinn, Inter Partes Review: Overview and Statistics, IPWATCHDOG (Feb 9, 2014), http://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/09/inter-partes-review-overview-and-statistics/id=47894/ [http://perma.
cc/FH5W-2N6V] (providing a brief overview of IPR and the process for invalidating a patent through 
IPR). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board is a board created by statute that includes Administrative 
Patent Judges, who may hear and render decisions concerning patent appeals and challenges to patent 
validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (establishing the Patent Trial and Appeal Board); About PTAB, 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/resources/about-ptab [http://perma.cc/4942-M32Y] 
(giving an overview of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). 
 5 See Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country, BUS. L. TODAY, July–Aug. 
2003, at 49–50, 52, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2003-07-08/galanda.html [http://perma.
cc/KT3B-899G] (highlighting the extensive nature of tribal sovereign immunity, stating that Indian 
tribes are generally found immune from suit because of tribal sovereign immunity, and advising law-
yers to understand such implications prior to doing business with an Indian tribe); Thomas, supra note 
1 (describing the sale of six patents from Allergan to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe). 
 6 See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014) (finding that the Bay 
Mills Indian Community could not be sued because of tribal immunity); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 
at 58 (finding that a tribe is exempt from suit because of tribal sovereign immunity); Seneca Tel. Co. 
v. Miami Tribe, 253 P.3d 53, 55–57 (Okla. 2011) (dismissing a lawsuit against the Miami Tribe on 
grounds of tribal immunity despite clear evidence that the tribe was negligent in causing damage). 
 7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2015) (describing American Indian tribes as sovereign entities with federally recognized 
sovereign immunity); Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the 
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 619–22 (2010) (explaining the origins of 
tribal sovereign immunity as a judicially created doctrine that has been limited over the years yet still 
remains largely unchanged); William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1624 (2013) (describing that the United States recognized tribal sov-
ereignty by enacting treaties with the tribes). 
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numerous ways in which one can abuse tribal immunity, including entering 
into a transaction similar to that in the Allergan case.8 By entering into such a 
transaction in which property is transferred to an Indian tribe, the individual 
may avoid lawsuits concerning the property by allowing the Indian tribe to 
assert immunity.9 With the courts reserving all power to abrogate Indian sover-
eign immunity to Congress, Congress must act to limit the scope of tribal im-
munity and close the loophole that allows individuals to exploit Native Ameri-
can Indian tribal immunity.10 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of tribal sovereign immunity, 
the types of immunity that are generally recognized by United States courts, 
and discusses modern cases testing the limits of tribal sovereign immunity.11 
Part II provides an analysis of the scope of tribal sovereign immunity and how 
tribal sovereign immunity can be abused by non-tribe members to escape law-
suits.12 Part III argues that Congress needs to enact new legislation limiting the 
permissible uses of tribal sovereign immunity and discusses other theories that 
can help narrow the scope of tribal immunity.13 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The history and development of Native American Indian law in the Unit-
ed States is distinct from other types of American law, resulting in a unique 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2037 (dismissing a case concerning a tribe because the 
tribe had sovereign immunity); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) 
(finding that tribal sovereign immunity necessitated dismissal of the case); Three Affiliated Tribes of 
the Fort Berthold Reservation v. World Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890–91 (1986) (stating that without 
congressional limitation of tribal sovereign immunity, the tribe could not be sued); Santa Clara Pueb-
lo, 436 U.S. at 58 (finding that Native American tribes have long enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity, 
which protects a tribe from being sued); Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass’n, 169 P.3d 53, 
55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (describing tribal sovereign immunity as a broad protection conferring 
immunity from suit that extends to activities both on and off tribal lands); Wood, supra note 7, at 
1663 (stating that the Supreme Court continues to uphold tribal immunity); Galanda, supra note 5, at 
50 (describing that tribal immunity can protect tribes in business enterprises both on and off tribal 
land, and with respect to contracts, a tribe usually can only be sued if there is a waiver of the tribe’s 
immunity or explicit authorization from Congress). 
 9 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2037 (dismissing a case concerning a transaction with 
a tribe because the tribe properly asserted immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 75 (finding that despite the 
tribe breaching a contract, the tribe could not be sued because of tribal immunity); Galanda, supra 
note 5, at 50 (stating that tribal immunity often extends to business transactions of a tribe). 
 10 See World Eng’g, 476 U.S. at 890–91 (stating that without congressional limitation of tribal 
sovereign immunity, the tribe could not be sued); Wood, supra note 7, at 1662 (describing that most 
court cases involving tribal immunity recognize Congress’s power to limit it); Davidson, supra note 1, 
at 36 (alluding to the idea that one can “gam[e] the system” of sovereign immunity). 
 11 See infra notes 14–123 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 124–178 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 179–215 and accompanying text. 
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semi-sovereign system of government.14 The recognition of tribal sovereignty 
resulted in the creation of Native American Indian sovereign immunity by the 
United States Supreme Court, granting immunity from suit to Indian tribes 
with very few limitations.15 Though some limitations have been imposed 
through statute over the years, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity con-
tinues to protect Indian tribes even when the tribe is clearly culpable.16 Despite 
the frequent injustices caused by Indian sovereign immunity, United States 
courts have repeatedly emphasized that only Congress has the ability to limit 
the scope of the immunity, leaving the judicial system powerless to protect in-
jured parties.17 Section A discusses the origins and creation of American Indian 
Law in the United States.18 Section B provides background information on 
immunity and the types of immunity commonly recognized in the United 
States legal system.19 Section C then discusses tribal sovereign immunity, how 
it is commonly used in a lawsuit and examines the scope of tribal immunity.20 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2015) (describing that the Constitution ascribes specific duties in relation to the United 
States and state governments but treats Indian tribes separately). See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTO-
RY 19–21 (2004) (describing the United States’ westward expansion in the early 1800s, particularly 
with the respect to the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, necessitating the unique formation of Indian law). 
 15 See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (Fidelity) (recognizing 
that the sovereignty of Indian tribes confers an immunity from suit without authorization from Con-
gress); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (recognizing American Indian tribes as 
sovereign independent communities); CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NA-
TIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 482–83 (7th ed. 2015) (describing that tribal immunity 
may only be waived by the tribes themselves or with express authorization from Congress, presenting 
the few limitations on the exercise of tribal immunity). 
 16 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (illustrating a limitation on tribal sovereign immunity 
by allowing a state to sue a tribe that violates a tribal-state compact regarding certain gaming activi-
ties); Seneca, 253 P.3d 53, 55–57 (finding that the Seneca Indian tribe could not be sued because of 
sovereign immunity despite clear evidence that the tribe was negligent). 
 17 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2037 (stating that the Indian tribe cannot be sued 
unless Congress expressly limits the scope of tribal immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that 
because no statute limited tribal immunity, the Kiowa Tribe properly asserted immunity from suit); 
World Eng’g, 476 U.S. at 892 (stating that the Indian tribes could not be sued because of tribal sover-
eign immunity); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (finding that the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe could 
not be sued); Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–57 (concluding that in spite of the negligence of the tribe, the 
case must be dismissed, leaving the plaintiff without a legal remedy); Florida v. Seminole Tribe of 
Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Seminole Tribe of Florida properly assert-
ed tribal sovereign immunity and thus could not be sued). Congress’s ability to regulate Indian affairs 
stems from the plenary power of Congress, which effectively grants Congress broad power to legislate 
Indian affairs so long as the Constitution is not violated. See Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Politi-
cal Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666, 680–82 (2016) (explaining 
the plenary power of Congress as it relates to the Indian tribes, which grants Congress the ability to 
regulate Indian affairs). 
 18 See infra notes 23–36 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 48–84 and accompanying text. 
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Section D explores how tribal sovereign immunity can be limited in light of 
the precedent set by the court system.21 Finally, Section E provides a discus-
sion of a court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving Native American tribes.22 
A. The Origins of American Indian Law 
As the United States continued to expand West in the 1800s, the United 
States government had to create and understand law concerning the American 
Indians.23 One major concern facing the federal government was whether the 
Native Indian tribes were sovereign at all, or merely ad hoc members of the 
United States.24 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the Indian tribes could not file suit in federal court because federal courts 
lacked original jurisdiction over cases involving tribes.25 The Court recognized 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 85–112 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 113–123 and accompanying text. 
 23 See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 50–52 
(2008) (explaining that the expansion of the United States caused the government to pass several new 
treaties concerning the Indian tribes, predominantly to force the tribes off of their native lands); LAW-
SON & SEIDMAN, supra note 14 (describing the United States’ westward expansion). Three cases 
decided by the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1800s concern-
ing American Indian law, often referred to as the “Marshall Trilogy,” largely laid the foundation for 
Indian law in America. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (stating that American Indians are rec-
ognized to be sovereign independent communities); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
18 (1831) (resolving the question of whether the Indian tribes are considered “foreign nations” as used 
in the Constitution, or something different altogether); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
604 (1823) (reasoning that private citizens may not purchase land from Native Americans; only the 
Federal Government may acquire such lands through treaties); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS 
GEN., AM. INDIAN L. DESKBOOK § 1.1 (2017) (referring to the three aforementioned cases as the 
“Marshall Trilogy”). The question whether the Indian tribes were foreign nations, for example like 
France or Germany, was important as it would define what rights the tribes would have as sovereigns, 
independent of the United States. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra (explaining 
that the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes would depend upon 
whether the Indian tribes were foreign nations or something different). 
 24 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 (concluding that the Indian tribes are not “foreign 
nations,” but something different). When the United States government was established, it was not 
clear whether the Indian tribes should be considered foreign nations, part of the United States by vir-
tue of their land being within the boundary of the United States, or something different. See id. at 18–
20 (describing the Native American Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” that are not mem-
bers of the United States as are the states, nor are they foreign nations). 
 25 See id. at 20 (finding that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over the lawsuit). In the 
case, the Court reasoned that federal jurisdiction stems from article III, § 2 of the United States Con-
stitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18–19. The question 
addressed by the Court was thus whether an Indian tribe can properly be considered a “foreign state” 
as used in Article III, Section 2 thereby granting the court jurisdiction to hear the case. See Cherokee 
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19–20 (reasoning that “foreign state” was akin to “foreign nation,” and as 
such does not include Indian tribes in its definition). The Court concluded that Indian tribes are not 
“foreign states,” but instead they are separate dependent entities of the United States, and therefore 
federal jurisdiction may not be exercised over the tribes in accordance with Article III, Section 2. See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (allowing judicial power over “foreign states”); see Cherokee Nation, 
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19–20 (finding that Indian tribes were not included in the contemplated meaning of 
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that the tribes are not equivalent to the states of the United States, instead the 
tribes have a unique relationship with the United States that the court described 
as a “ward to his guardian.”26 In concluding this, the Court considered whether 
the tribes could properly be classified as foreign nations subject to the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts.27 
The Court drew its conclusion by turning to Article I, Section Eight of the 
United States Constitution.28 The Court reasoned that because the United 
States Constitution expressly delineated foreign nations and Indian tribes, the 
two must be distinct.29 Ultimately, the Court declined to assert its jurisdiction 
over the case, stating that federal court was not the proper forum to decide the 
rights of the Cherokee Nation tribe.30 
In 1832, the Supreme Court heard Worcester v. Georgia, which laid the 
foundation for much of modern American Indian law.31 The Court ruled that 
Indian tribes are separate sovereign entities, yet still subject to federal law.32 
As a result, no state-made law can be enforced against an Indian tribe.33 The 
                                                                                                                           
“foreign states”). Note that more recent statutes enacted by Congress have granted courts jurisdiction 
to hear certain cases involving Native American Indians and tribes. See infra notes 85–112 and ac-
companying text. 
 26 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16–17 (describing the unique relationship that exists 
between the Native Indian tribes and the United States). 
 27 See id. at 20 (stating that the question before the Court was whether the Native tribes can 
properly be considered foreign nations). 
 28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress has the power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes, implying that the two entities should be treated separately); 
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19–20 (questioning whether Indian tribes are considered foreign 
nations for purposes of finding jurisdiction over the case). 
 29 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19–20 (reasoning that the distinction made between 
foreign nations and Indian tribes in the Constitution must mean that Indian tribes are not foreign na-
tions). 
 30 See id. at 20 (concluding that although the Cherokee Nation has rights, United States federal 
court is not a forum that can judicial rulings on those rights). 
 31 See generally Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (declaring that matters relating to the relation-
ship between Native American Indian tribes and the United States belongs solely to the United States 
government); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra note 23, § 1.1 (highlighting the princi-
ples of tribal sovereign immunity and emphasizing how Worcester implements these principles). 
 32 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (stating that Indian tribes are recognized as independent 
political communities, yet treaties and acts of Congress still have full effect over the tribes). 
 33 See id. (concluding that state-law has no force over Indian tribes except when the tribes assent 
to the laws or the laws comport with federal treaties or acts). In Worcester, the Court made clear that 
the United States federal government retains the exclusive power to regulate affairs with the Indian 
tribes. See id. (noting that the relationship with the Cherokee Nation was “vested in the government of 
the United States”). This power comes from the United States Constitution, which provides that Con-
gress has the authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(granting Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 
559 (stating that the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate affairs with the Indian tribes). 
The decision in Worcester was partially abrogated in the late 1800s, allowing state criminal laws to 
apply to non-Indians on Indian lands. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) 
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Court further reasoned that the United States Congress has the sole power to 
manage affairs with the Indian tribes.34 By establishing that the Indian tribes 
are sovereign entities, and that only Congress may enter into treaties with the 
Indians, the Court first hinted at the idea of tribal sovereign immunity and how 
such immunity could be abrogated.35 This broad decision by the Supreme 
Court thus set the boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity, providing a power-
ful means to escape lawsuits.36 
B. A Brief Introduction to Immunity 
Immunity refers to the concept of being judgment proof either through 
immunity from suit or immunity from liability.37 Although both immunity from 
suit and immunity from liability will exempt a party from liability, immunity 
from suit provides a stronger protection because it completely prevents a party 
from being sued.38 In contrast, immunity from liability serves as a defense in a 
                                                                                                                           
(concluding that although the federal government did not have jurisdiction over the murder of a non-
Indian by a non-Indian on an Indian reservation, the state court did have jurisdiction). 
 34 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558–59 (stating that the United States Congress maintains 
exclusive rights to manage Indian affairs). The Court’s reasoning stems from the historical back-
ground that only the British Crown initially had the power to create agreements with the Indians as the 
new colonies were being formed. See id. at 558 (describing how the power to make treaties initially 
“reside[d] in the crown”). Once the United States government was setup, this power passed from the 
Crown to Congress. See id. (noting how Congress assumed those powers). 
 35 See id. at 558–59, 561 (holding that Indian tribes were their own “nation,” and that only the 
United States federal government could interact with the Indian tribes). The Worcester decision itself 
did not recognize tribal immunity, but the decision is largely regarded as the case that led to the doc-
trine. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting Worcester as the basis for tribal sovereignty); 
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558–59 (recognizing treaties as the primary method of regulating affairs 
with the tribes); Foxworthy, 169 P.3d at 226 (citing Worcester as the first Supreme Court decision 
officially recognizing tribal sovereignty); WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 36.7 
(3d ed. 2011) (citing Worcester as first recognizing tribal sovereignty and the relationship between 
state law and federal law with respect to Indian tribes). Notably in 1871, Congress passed the Indian 
Appropriations Act stating that the United States will no longer enter into treaties with the Indian 
tribes and instead, Congress will pass statutes. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012) (stating that no new treaties 
will be entered into with the Indian tribes); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 115 (6th ed. 2015) (stating that prior to the passage of the Indian Appropriations Act, the 
federal government largely regulated Indian affairs through treaty, though statutes were also used). 
 36 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559–61 (stating that Indian tribes are sovereign independent 
communities, yet Congress has authority to regulate affairs with the tribes); CANBY, supra note 35, at 
75–76 (explaining that in the wake of the Worcester decision, the Indian tribes enjoy sovereignty free 
from state abrogation and few limitations from Congress); see also Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 
(highlighting the potential power of tribal sovereign immunity to avoid lawsuits not only by American 
Indians but also those who enter into contracts with the Indian tribes). 
 37 Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining immunity as an exemption 
from liability or even a lawsuit altogether). 
 38 See David K. Jaffe, Distinctions Between Sovereign Immunity & Governmental Immunity, 
BPSLAWYERS (Aug. 13, 2009), https://www.bpslawyers.com/Articles/Distinction-between-Sovereign-
Immunity-Governmental-Immunity.shtml [http://perma.cc/99KN-ZGGD] (recognizing immunity 
from suit as a right not to be tried whereas immunity from liability solely protects a party from poten-
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lawsuit where a party must argue a case on the merits, yet the party may ulti-
mately be exempt from liability.39 The distinction between immunity from suit 
and immunity from liability is thus important with respect to understanding 
Indian sovereign immunity because the type of immunity conferred determines 
whether the party may be sued at all.40 If tribal immunity confers an immunity 
from suit, then the Indian tribes will not have to argue the case on the merits 
and may seek to immediately dismiss the lawsuit.41 If, however, tribal immuni-
ty confers an immunity from liability, the tribe would only be able to assert 
immunity as an affirmative defense to any potential liability and damages.42 
This distinction is particularly relevant depending on the type of relief sought 
in a lawsuit because although both types of immunity can prevent the payment 
of money damages, immunity from suit will always protect against declara-
tions, injunctions, and other equitable relief, but immunity from liability may 
not.43 
                                                                                                                           
tial liability); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (finding that immunity from suit 
protects a party from the burdens of trial because the lawsuit may be immediately dismissed when 
immunity from suit applies); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc., v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 
1986) (stating that immunity from suit provides complete protection from a lawsuit, not merely im-
munity from liability). 
 39 See Jeffery S. Boyd, Where Sovereign Immunity and Water Development Issues Collide, 39 
TEX. ENVTL. L. J. 95, 98 (2009) (reasoning that where immunity from suit completely bars a lawsuit, 
immunity from liability does not prevent a court from hearing the case); see also Nunag-Tanedo v. 
E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch., 711 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that immunity from liability 
only acts as an affirmative defense in a lawsuit, not as a means of avoiding a lawsuit altogether). The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an affirmative defense, such as immunity from liability, 
may be asserted in a responsive pleading to a lawsuit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (enumerating a list of 
affirmative defenses). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide that certain defenses may be 
asserted prior to a responsive pleading, such as Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, which may reasonably include an assertion of immunity from suit. FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). Consequently, an assertion of immunity from suit may cause a case to be dismissed prior to 
any argument on the merits where as a claim of immunity from liability may only provide an exemp-
tion from liability at the conclusion of trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (providing a list of affirmative 
defenses); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing that cases may be dismissed for “failure to state a 
claim”). 
 40 See Boyd, supra note 39, at 98 (stating that although immunity from suit deprives a court juris-
diction to hear a claim, immunity from liability does not). 
 41 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (stating that a lawsuit may be immediately dismissed if immunity 
from suit is properly asserted). 
 42 See Boyd, supra note 39, at 98 (explaining that immunity from liability does not bar a court 
from hearing a case); Nunag-Tanedo, 711 F.3d at 1140 (stating that immunity from liability only pro-
vides a defense, and therefore it is not a right to not stand trial). 
 43 Compare Hamaatsa v. Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P.3d 977, 988 (2016) (holding that the Pueblo 
tribe properly asserted tribal immunity from suit in a lawsuit seeking a declaration as to the owner of a 
road, resulting in dismissal of the lawsuit), with Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 962 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that a government official with immunity from liability may still be subject to equitable rem-
edies). A declaration, also called a declaratory judgment, is an adjudication by a court that determines 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a lawsuit. Declaratory Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An injunction is a binding court order to perform an action or stop an ac-
tion. Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Equitable relief or equitable remedy is a 
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Generally, the type of immunity asserted determines the specific type of 
immunity conferred.44 Frequently cited types of immunity such as absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, and sovereign immunity traditionally confer 
immunity from suit.45 Comparatively, immunity from liability can be created 
by statute, expressly relieving a party from liability under certain circumstanc-
es.46 Despite the general scheme of immunities presented, Indian tribal sover-
eign immunity largely originates outside of these standard types of immunity, 
instead coming from the judicial recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty.47 
                                                                                                                           
remedy sought under the law of equity, i.e. nonmonetary, and often takes the form of an injunction or 
specific performance. Equitable Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 44 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (finding that qualified immunity grants the same immunity as abso-
lute immunity, that is, immunity from suit). Sovereign immunity originates from the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which does not allow a citizen of one state to sue an-
other State, thereby granting each State immunity from suit. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) (expanding state sovereign immunity by finding that a state cannot 
be sued by citizens of that state unless the state consents to suit). Sovereign immunity as an important 
doctrine in the history of the United States government is also considered in the Federalist Papers, in 
which Hamilton stated that sovereigns cannot be sued without consent. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 
(Alexander Hamilton) (stating that an inherent characteristic of a sovereign is the right not to be sued 
without consent). Note also that although immunity from suit most often takes the form of absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, or sovereign immunity, this is not an exhaustive list of the types of 
immunity from suit. See Abney v. U.S., 431 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1977) (finding that the 5th Amend-
ment Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that an individual will not be tried twice for the same crime, 
effectively granting a type of immunity from suit). 
 45 See supra note 44 (providing examples of frequently cited types of immunity). Absolute im-
munity is based upon public policy and is most often invoked by executive federal officials such as 
the President of the United States. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744–45 (1982) (stating that 
the President is afforded absolute immunity conferring immunity from suit in order to ease the pres-
sures of the high office and encourage decision making). Similarly, qualified immunity is typically 
afforded to lower-level government officials such as governors, but it requires certain conditions to be 
met. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (finding that qualified immunity rather than 
absolute immunity is granted to executive officials such as governors). The Eleventh Amendment 
grants states sovereign immunity, affording states immunity from suit. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XI 
(stating that lawsuits by a citizen of one state against another state are prohibited); Hans, 134 U.S. at 
20 (expanding the understanding of the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit a citizen of a state to sue that 
state). 
 46 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2018) (granting immunity from liability when an individual 
provides medical assistance to a person in need but fails in rendering aid, causing injury). As an illus-
tration of immunity from liability, Hawaii’s Good Samaritan statute provides protection from civil 
damages to individuals who provide emergency care in good faith to a person in need of such aid. Id. 
Although the individual rendering aid will have to stand trial if he or she causes injury, the statute 
provides immunity from liability, allowing the defendant to assert immunity as an affirmative defense 
and consequently be immune from civil damages. See id. 
 47 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (stating that tribal immunity confers immunity from 
suit); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919) (recognizing the existence of tribal sovereign 
immunity as an inherent characteristic of a tribe’s sovereignty); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 
471 (stating that tribal immunity comes from the sovereign nature of the tribes). 
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C. Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
1. The Creation of Tribal Immunity 
Although the decision in Worcester v. Georgia clarified that the Indian 
tribes are independent political communities, it was not made immediately 
clear what rights the tribes enjoy as an independent community.48 In 1895, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians further 
elucidated the rights of Indian tribes as political sovereigns.49 The court stated 
that although the Indian tribes are separate independent communities with their 
own laws, the tribes are “domestic and dependent” and thus subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States.50 The tribes are therefore treated similarly to the 
states, with the court ruling that a tribe cannot be sued without the tribe’s con-
sent or without the consent of Congress.51 The court further noted that Con-
gress has never consented to tribes being sued generally by private parties.52 
Thebo thus presented an early framework for tribal sovereignty.53 The Supreme 
Court adopted and reiterated this decision in Turner v. United States, stating 
that without authorization from Congress, a tribe could not be sued.54 
Having established that a sovereign immunity right exists for Indian 
tribes, courts had yet to identify the limitations of that right and how a tribe 
may exercise it.55 In United States v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., the 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (stating that the Indian tribes are politically independent 
yet subject to treaties entered into by the United States, but not explicitly clarifying what rights the 
tribes have as independent communities). 
 49 See Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1895) (holding that Indian 
tribes enjoy a right not to be sued without consent as do the sovereign states of the United States). 
 50 See id. (stating that although the Indian tribes enjoy some rights as sovereigns, they are still 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States federal government). 
 51 See id. (reasoning that the sovereignty of the tribes is similar to that of that states, and therefore 
the tribes cannot be sued without consent). 
 52 See id. (finding that tribes may not be sued by private parties without consent just as a State 
may not be sued without consent). 
 53 See id. (concluding that tribal immunity confers a right not to be sued without consent of the 
tribe or consent from Congress); Wood, supra note 7, at 1645–46 (stating that Thebo was the first 
federal court case to expressly use the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity). 
 54 See Turner, 248 U.S. at 358 (finding that the Creek Nation Tribe could not be sued without 
authorization from Congress). In Turner, the Creek Nation Tribe was sued by a private individual 
seeking damages for destruction of property. Id. at 357. Although the court stated that Turner was not 
a case about tribal sovereign immunity, the court did re-affirm the principle that a tribe cannot be sued 
without consent from Congress. Id. at 358 
 55 See id. at 358 (implicitly recognizing sovereign immunity of a tribe but failing to define its 
contours). In a much later Supreme Court case, the Court admits that the decision in Turner created 
sovereign immunity “almost by accident,” and consequently the case did not clearly define the right 
conferred by tribal immunity. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756–57 (explaining that although Turner recog-
nized the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the decision did not expand upon the meaning of the doc-
trine). But see Wood, supra note 7, at 1590 (arguing that the doctrine of tribal immunity was not cre-
ated by accident). Later Supreme Court cases would thus determine the scope and meaning of tribal 
sovereign immunity. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) 
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Supreme Court specifically held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity 
as an immunity from suit.56 The Court reasoned that as sovereigns, the Indian 
tribes enjoy a right not to be sued just as the United States enjoys a right not to 
be sued.57 Although the Court concluded that the tribes have a right to assert 
sovereign immunity from suit, that right is subject to certain limitations.58 As 
with other claims of immunity from suit, tribal immunity may be waived by 
the party being sued, creating one limitation.59 Dissimilar from other types of 
immunity from suit, however, Congress may also authorize a suit against an 
Indian tribe by specifically allowing the suit, providing another significant lim-
itation to tribal immunity.60 
                                                                                                                           
(stating that Indian tribes enjoy immunity from suit, but individual members of the tribe do not); Fi-
delity, 309 U.S. at 512 (finding that the Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity as an immunity from 
suit without authorization from Congress); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion, 231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956) (finding that Indian tribes enjoy immunity from suit unless Con-
gress authorizes the suit or the tribe waives its immunity). 
 56 See Fidelity, 309 U.S. at 512–13 (finding that Indian tribes have immunity from direct suits as 
well as cross-suits). Fidelity was the first Supreme Court case to expressly recognize the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity. See Wood, supra note 7, at 1594 (stating that the Supreme Court first ex-
plicitly recognized tribal immunity in Fidelity). 
 57 See Fidelity, 309 U.S. at 512–13 (explaining that sovereigns enjoy a right not to be sued with-
out consent, and Indian nations enjoy this right). The Court notes, however, that Congress can author-
ize a suit against an Indian tribe. Id. at 512 (stating that Congress may authorize a lawsuit against a 
tribe despite the tribe’s immunity). 
 58 See Fidelity, 309 U.S. at 512–13 (stating that a tribe may be sued despite immunity if the law-
suit is consented to by the tribe or authorized by Congress). 
 59 See id. (finding that an Indian tribe may waive its immunity from suit by consenting to the 
suit). Other types of immunity from suit, such as absolute immunity and Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, may be waived by consenting to the suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (illustrating Congress 
waiving its immunity from suit in certain damages claims); Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (stating that a state 
may be sued if it consents, despite a state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity). A waiver of 
immunity may occur in a contract, in which a party agrees to waive their immunity in exchange for 
other favorable provisions. See Pettigrew v. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 
2013) (finding that a State may consent to suit through contract, waiving its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity); Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94, 96 (Del. 1974) (stating that the State implicitly waives its 
immunity to suit for breach of contract when the State enters into a contract). 
 60 See Fidelity, 309 U.S. at 512 (stating that an Indian tribe may be sued with congressional au-
thorization); Thebo, 66 F. at 375 (finding that Congress may authorize suits against Indian tribes be-
cause the tribes are subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the U.S.). Because Indian tribes are 
subject to treaties and statutes enacted by Congress, Congress may authorize suits against tribes, fur-
ther illustrating the “domestic and dependent” relationship between the Indian tribes and United States 
government. See Thebo, 66 F. at 375 (stating that an Indian tribe may be sued if Congress authorizes 
the suit); see also CANBY, supra note 35, at 97, 107 (stating that Congress has authority to limit tribal 
sovereignty, including the ability to waive a tribe’s immunity from suit). One way in which Congress 
can authorize a lawsuit against a tribe is by passing a statute that expressly states that tribes are subject 
to suit in certain conditions. See CANBY, supra note 35, at 97, 107 (explaining that Congress has au-
thority to limit a tribe’s immunity); see also Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) 
(providing a statute enacted by Congress that allows a tribe to be sued under certain conditions related 
to gaming). 
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2. Testing Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Modern Immunity Cases 
Although there are limitations to tribal immunity, asserting tribal sover-
eign immunity is often an effective means of avoiding a lawsuit.61 Kiowa Tribe 
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies Inc. provides a powerful illustra-
tion in which Manufacturing Technologies sued the Kiowa Tribe for defaulting 
on a promissory note.62 Manufacturing Technologies subsequently sued the 
Tribe in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract.63 The state court deter-
mined that despite tribal immunity, the Tribe could be sued in state court for 
breaches of contract involving commercial activity that took place off the Indi-
an reservation.64 Following the judgment against the Tribe, the Tribe appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court.65 The Supreme Court reversed, stating 
that regardless of the nature of the activity, the location of the activity, and 
cause of action, the Tribe has a right to assert immunity from suit.66 The Court 
reasoned that tribal immunity extends to breaches of contract and similar civil 
cases because tribal immunity is a matter of federal law, and therefore only 
Congress can limit the Tribe’s immunity.67 Since Congress had not passed any 
legislation restricting tribal immunity in civil matters involving breaches of 
contract, the Tribe properly asserted immunity from suit.68 
Articulating a concern that tribal sovereign immunity is overly broad, Jus-
tice Stevens dissented, stating that tribal immunity should not be extended in 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that the Bay Mills tribe could not be 
sued because they have tribal immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that the Kiowa Tribe 
properly asserted immunity from suit and thus the lawsuit against them warranted dismissal); World 
Eng’g, 476 U.S. at 892 (stating that the Indian tribes could not be sued because of tribal sovereign 
immunity); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (finding that the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe could not be 
sued); Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 167–68 (finding that tribal sovereign immunity excuses the 
Puyallup Tribe from suit in an action seeking an injunction to prevent the Tribe from fishing); Semi-
nole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1245 (finding that the Seminole Tribe of Florida properly asserted tribal sov-
ereign immunity and thus could not be sued). 
 62 Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 753–54. A promissory note is an absolute promise by a party to pay back 
the issuer of the note or other designee. Promissory Note, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 63 Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754. 
 64 Id. The trial court decision was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, and the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to review the case further. Id. The United States Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari. Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 760 (stating that Indian tribes are immune from suit even on breach of contract claims 
unless the tribe consents to suit or Congress authorizes the suit). 
 67 See id. at 759 (reasoning that tribal immunity can only be limited by Congress, and therefore a 
court has no authority to place a limit on tribal immunity). 
 68 See id. at 760 (finding that Congress has not abrogated tribal immunity with respect to lawsuits 
involving private breaches of contract). 
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such a sizeable manner.69 Justice Stevens in particular focused on the harm to 
plaintiffs that necessarily results from the Kiowa decision.70 Because plaintiffs 
typically do not know that they can contract or negotiate away tribal immunity, 
plaintiffs are put in a position in which they cannot recover damages despite 
their injury and the tribe’s culpability.71 Moreover, Justice Stevens called atten-
tion to the fact that the judicially created doctrine of tribal immunity has little 
precedent and sparse reasoning, and thus argued that the Court should decline 
to extend sovereign immunity to transactions that occur off reservation lands.72 
Despite Justice Stevens’ strong dissent, the Supreme Court has continued 
to uphold that tribal immunity affords tribes immunity from suit.73 In 2014, in 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, Michigan sued the Bay Mills Indian 
Community for opening a casino off of reservation lands in violation of a trib-
al-state compact and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).74 In Bay 
Mills Indian Community, the Court reiterated the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity and emphasized that without Congressional authorization or consent 
to suit, an Indian tribe cannot be sued.75 Moreover, the Court expressly de-
clined to revisit precedent on tribal immunity, upholding the decision in Kio-
wa. 76 
Importantly, the ruling in Bay Mills Indian Community further clarified 
that tribal sovereign immunity can be asserted in cases involving all types of 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that tribal immunity should not be 
extended to off-reservation commercial activity and in such cases, state courts should have the author-
ity to deny assertions of tribal immunity). 
 70 See id. at 766 (reasoning that tort victims are especially vulnerable in situations where the vic-
tim is seeking relief from an Indian tribe). 
 71 See id. (finding that plaintiffs are often unaware of tribal immunity, and therefore will they will 
not seek to negotiate a waiver of immunity). 
 72 See id. at 761–62, 764 (stating that tribal sovereign immunity was created accidentally by the 
Court assuming such immunity existed without providing much reasoning). Justice Stevens further 
argued that the doctrine of tribal immunity suffers from flawed rationale in that the Court attempts to 
justify the doctrine by asserting that the Indians did not have an opportunity to bargain with the United 
States in joining the Union as opposed to the states, which did. Id. at 765. 
 73 See id. at 760 (explaining that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not have been ex-
tended so broadly); CANBY, supra note 35, at 99 (explaining that the doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity is “well established,” and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Bay Mills Indian 
Community, refusing to overturn the decision in Kiowa). 
 74 Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028. The IGRA is a federal act that provides for the 
operation of Indian gaming activities when allowed by State law. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 
25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (providing a statute under which Indian tribes may operate gaming casinos 
when permissible under State law). 
 75 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2030–31 (stating that tribal immunity grants immuni-
ty from suit even when a state sues a tribe). 
 76 See id. at 2031, 2036 (declining to overturn Kiowa or reverse past precedent concerning tribal 
immunity); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that Indian tribes are immune from suits that 
concern off-reservation commercial activity unless there is authorization from Congress or a waiver of 
immunity). 
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off-reservation commercial transactions.77 Although Kiowa established that 
tribal immunity can be asserted in contract cases arising out of transactions 
that take place on or off Indian lands, the decision in Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity expanded the scope of tribal immunity to apply in any commercial 
transaction regardless of location.78 In Bay Mills Indian Community, the Court 
reiterated that tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and without express 
abrogation of immunity from Congress, the Court will not find a limitation to 
immunity.79 Thus, from the ruling in Bay Mills Indian Community, it seems 
that tribal immunity can preempt any lawsuit involving a commercial transac-
tion unless Congress has clearly abrogated the immunity or the tribe has 
waived its immunity.80 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority decision in Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity resulted in four justices dissenting, with dissenting opinions penned by 
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg.81 In the longest of the 
dissents, Justice Thomas points out the overly broad protection that tribal im-
munity provides and bluntly asserts that granting such an extensive immunity 
from suit was a mistake that the Court wrongly refuses to rectify.82 Although 
Justice Thomas does support the idea of allowing assertions of tribal immunity 
in tribal courts located within tribal reservations, any extension of tribal im-
munity beyond that is without a rational basis.83 Thus, although the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (stating that the Court will not itself limit tribal 
immunity for off-reservation lands without express intent to do so from Congress). 
 78 See id. (finding that tribal immunity can be properly asserted even in a lawsuit that arises from 
a transaction off Indian land); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that the Tribe could not be sued over 
the commercial transaction that took place on Indian lands because of tribal immunity). 
 79 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (stating that only Congress has authority to 
abrogate tribal immunity). 
 80 See id. (finding that tribal immunity from suit protected the Bay Mills Indian Community even 
though the lawsuit concerned a commercial transaction that took place off the Indian reservation); 
CANBY, supra note 35, at 99, 107 (explaining that tribal immunity applies to commercial activities of 
a tribe, even if the activity occurs off reservation land). 
 81 Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2045 (5-4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Scalia, Ginsburg, & Alito, JJ.). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent but also wrote a short 
dissenting opinion stating that the Court’s decision in Kiowa, which he joined in, was wrongly decid-
ed and should have been reversed in Bay Mills Indian Cmty. Id. at 2045 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note 
that Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito all joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, but Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg also wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 2045 (Scalia, J. dissenting); id. at 2055 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 82 See id. at 134 S. Ct. at 2045–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the expansion of tribal 
immunity since Kiowa as wrong and made increasingly worse as more cases are decided by the 
Court). 
 83 Id. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas analyzed the historical arguments underlying the judi-
cially created doctrine of tribal immunity and why it should exist in relation to tribal courts on tribal 
land. Id. at 2046–49. However, Justice Thomas respectfully asserted that the extension of tribal im-
munity to off-reservation commercial activity was an overstep. See id. at 2047 (arguing that upholding 
tribal immunity in cases involving commercial transactions that take place in a state impedes upon the 
sovereignty of that state, and therefore, such assertions of immunity violate the Constitution). Moreo-
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Court has continued to uphold tribal immunity as a powerful means of avoid-
ing lawsuits, there is substantial disagreement as to the limits of tribal immuni-
ty and how tribal immunity should be abrogated.84 
D. Abrogating Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Power Reserved for Congress 
Although tribal immunity is judicially created, the courts have stated that 
only Congress has the power to abrogate it.85 In abrogating tribal immunity, 
Congress may limit the cases in which immunity can be asserted or even elim-
inate the doctrine altogether.86 Consequently, in cases brought to court in 
which an Indian tribe is sued, the court must determine whether tribal immuni-
ty has been abrogated or if Congress authorized the suit through a statute.87 
Alternatively, the suit may proceed if the tribe consents to the suit, constituting 
a waiver of immunity.88 This gives rise to the question of how Congress can 
abrogate tribal immunity and in what circumstances, if any, immunity has been 
eliminated or limited.89 
In passing the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, Congress stated that it 
would no longer enter into treaties with tribes, which was the original means 
                                                                                                                           
ver, Justice Thomas reasoned that the Court and Congress should have the authority to abrogate tribal 
immunity given that tribal immunity is a judicially created doctrine already shaped by the decisions of 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 2049–50. 
 84 See id. at 2045 (upholding the right of the tribe to assert tribal immunity, but drawing a strong 
dissent from four justices of the Court); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declining to 
impose limitations on tribal sovereign immunity, causing three justices to dissent); CANBY, supra note 
35, at 99 (explaining that the Supreme Court has continued to uphold tribal immunity). 
 85 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (stating that Congress has the power to limit 
tribal immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759 (finding that Congress may limit tribal immunity by enact-
ing legislation); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (stating that Congress’s power to regulate tribal 
immunity is broad, especially compared to a court’s power, which is restrained). 
 86 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 107 (explaining that Congress has the authority to waive a tribe’s 
sovereign immunity, allowing a tribe to be sued). 
 87 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 482 (describing cases in which courts must determine 
whether the tribe waived its immunity or Congress expressly authorized a waiver of a tribe’s immuni-
ty); see also Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that Congress did not limit tribal 
immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that Congress did not limit tribal immunity); Santa Clara 
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (questioning whether Congress has abrogated tribal immunity allowing suits in 
IGRA cases); Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 167–68 (finding that the suit was not authorized by Con-
gress and therefore the Tribe was protected by tribal immunity); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 
(reasoning that Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity in the IGRA case at bar, nor did the Tribe 
consent to suit). 
 88 See Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 (reasoning that there was no abrogation of tribal immuni-
ty in the case at bar, nor did the Tribe consent to suit). Recall that tribal sovereign immunity may not 
be asserted if Congress has authorized the suit or if the tribe waives immunity by consenting to the 
suit. See CANBY, supra note 35, at 107, 109 (stating that a tribe’s sovereign immunity can be waived 
by Congress or by the tribe itself). 
 89 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 482–83 (illustrating cases in which courts must exam-
ine whether Congress waived a tribe’s sovereign immunity and to what extent the immunity was 
waived). 
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by which the federal government predominantly effected Indian law.90 Instead, 
Congress can now pass statutes that affect the laws governing the tribes.91 As a 
result, the primary way in which Congress can abrogate or limit tribal immuni-
ty is through statute.92 Tribal immunity can therefore continue to provide a 
means for Indian tribes to avoid liability unless Congress acts to pass a statute 
limiting the scope of the immunity.93 
Several cases highlight the difficulty of limiting tribal immunity through 
federal statute due to the narrow view with which courts read such statutes.94 
One of the major federal statutes that has spurred litigation with Indian tribes is 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), originally enacted in 1988.95 The 
IGRA provides that Indian tribes may regulate gaming on Indian lands subject 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Indian Appropriations Act, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012) (stating that Congress will no longer 
create treaties with tribes); CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1812 (1871) (stating that one of the 
primary purposes of the Indian Appropriations Act is to stop Congress from entering into new treaties 
with Indian tribes); CANBY, supra note 35, at 115 (explaining that the United States entered into 
“hundreds” of treaties with Indian tribes up until treaty making ceased in 1871, the year the Indian 
Appropriations Act was passed). 
 91 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 346 (stating that Congress can waive a tribe’s immun-
ity through congressional action); Native American Treaties, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/treaties [http://perma.cc/8C83-YQGE] (explain-
ing that in 1871, the United States government would no longer interact with the Indian tribes through 
treaty-making); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562 (stating that the Indian tribes are subject to 
federal law as separate yet dependent sovereigns of the United States). One of the primary reasons for 
ending treaty-making and instead favoring the enactment of statutes was that Congress wanted more 
of a role in shaping policy towards the Native Indians, which could be done with statute, but not with 
treaties because the power to enact treaties is reserved for the President with consent from the Senate. 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President has the power to enact treaties, with con-
sent from the Senate); CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1812 (1871) (stating that one reason for the 
Indian Appropriations Act is to give Congress more control in enacting legislation pertaining to the 
Native tribes); CANBY, supra note 35, at 121 (describing the power to make treaties as belonging 
largely to the president). 
 92 See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra note 23, § 7.2 (stating that the abrogation 
of tribal immunity largely stems from federal statutes that provide specific instances under which 
tribal immunity cannot be asserted). 
 93 See Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–56 (stating that Congress should act to abrogate tribal immunity so 
as to provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra note 
23, § 7.2 (providing an overview of some federal statutes that have abrogated tribal immunity, particu-
larly in criminal cases); CANBY, supra note 35, at 99–100 (explaining that tribal sovereign immunity 
can protect Indian tribes in commercial and governmental activities in both state and federal court, and 
in lawsuits for monetary damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 94 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2032 (finding that the IGRA partially abrogated tribal 
immunity, but the statute did not limit tribal immunity in the case); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 
(reasoning that the IGRA does abrogate tribal immunity in certain circumstances, but not in the case at 
bar); CANBY, supra note 35, at 107 (stating that where Congress acts to limit tribal immunity, any 
such limitation must be clearly expressed by Congress). 
 95 See 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (stating that Indian tribes may regulate gaming if not barred by Federal 
statute, and the gaming takes place in a state that does not prohibit it); Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. at 2032 (examining whether the IGRA abrogated tribal immunity); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 
1242 (finding that the IGRA did not abrogate tribal immunity). 
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to state laws prohibiting such gaming.96 In accordance with the IGRA, many 
states have chosen to enter into tribal-state compacts concerning specific gam-
ing activities in an effort to regulate gaming.97 
In Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, the State of Florida sued the Sem-
inole Tribe claiming a violation of class III gaming under the IGRA.98 In re-
sponse, the Seminole Tribe asserted sovereign immunity, claiming that the 
IGRA did not abrogate the Tribe’s immunity and therefore the Tribe could not 
be sued.99 The court thus had to determine whether the IGRA limited tribal 
immunity, and if so, to what extent.100 The court reasoned that tribal immunity 
is only abrogated or limited when Congress has clear intent to do so; without 
express language limiting tribal immunity, the court will not infer any limita-
tion.101 For example, Congress expressly limited tribal sovereignty in a provi-
sion of the IGRA by allowing a state to sue a tribe if the tribe violates a tribal-
state compact.102 In light of this IGRA provision, the court in Seminole Tribe 
reasoned that because Florida did not enter into any tribal-state compact with 
the Seminole Tribe, the Tribe could properly assert immunity from suit and 
avoid litigation.103 This case thus illustrates Congress’ ability to abrogate tribal 
                                                                                                                           
 96 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (asserting that Indian gaming is permissible provided that the gaming does 
not violate Federal law nor the laws of the State in which the gaming occurs). For an extensive back-
ground and overview of the IGRA, see generally Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulato-
ry Act: Background and Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99 (2010) (providing an in-depth intro-
duction to the IGRA, its history, and several provisions). 
 97 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 344 (explaining that tribal-state compacts are required under the 
IGRA in order to govern Indian gaming within a state). Tribal-state compacts are contracts entered 
into by the tribe and the state to regulate certain types of gaming activities in accordance with the 
IGRA. See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028–29 (describing a tribal-state compact that may 
be entered into in accordance with the IGRA); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1239 (describing an at-
tempt create a compact between the State of Florida and the Seminole Tribe concerning certain gam-
ing activities). 
 98 Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1239. Class III gaming is a type of gaming under the IGRA such as 
slot machines or blackjack, which are more strictly regulated than other types of gaming. See 25 
U.S.C. § 2703(8) (defining class III gaming as not class I or class II); Rob Capriccioso, Legal Distinc-
tion Between Class II and III Gaming Causes Innovation, Anguish, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, (Oct. 4, 
2011), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/travel/casinos-and-resorts/legal-distinction-between-
class-ii-and-iii-gaming-causes-innovation-anguish/ [http://perma.cc/ELB9-R6V5] (explaining that 
Class III gaming includes games such as blackjack, craps, and slot machines). 
 99 Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1239 (stating that the Seminole Tribe asserted tribal immunity and 
argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed). 
 100 See id. at 1241–42 (examining the IGRA and determining that the IGRA does not abrogate 
tribal immunity in the case). 
 101 See id. at 1242 (stating that only Congress has the power to abrogate tribal immunity and must 
do so with clear intent in a statute). 
 102 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (providing that a state may sue a tribe that violates a tribal-
state compact regarding certain gaming activities); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 (finding that 
Congress intentionally abrogated tribal immunity in cases where a tribe violates a tribal-state compact, 
allowing the state to sue the tribe). 
 103 See Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 (stating that the Seminole Tribe cannot be sued by Flor-
ida because the Tribe’s immunity was not limited by the IGRA under the circumstances). In Seminole 
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immunity, as well as the very narrow scope with which a court will read such 
abrogation, requiring clear intent and express language to find a limitation of a 
tribe’s immunity.104 
In 2014, the Supreme Court addressed the question of abrogating tribal 
immunity under the IGRA in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community.105 In 
Bay Mills Indian Community, the State of Michigan sued the Bay Mills Indian 
Community for operating certain gaming activities off reservation lands.106 
Similar to the plaintiff in Seminole Tribe, Michigan argued that the gaming 
activities were in violation of the IGRA, which allowed Michigan to sue the 
tribe.107 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected Michigan’s argument, rea-
soning that the IGRA only abrogated tribal immunity for violations of the 
IGRA that occurred on Indian reservation land, not off reservation land.108 Be-
cause the Bay Mills Indian Community was conducting activity off reservation 
land, the IGRA provision limiting tribal immunity did not apply and therefore 
Bay Mills could properly assert immunity from suit.109 Furthermore, the Court 
reiterated that only Congress has the authority to limit tribal immunity and 
must do so with clear intent through statute.110 
                                                                                                                           
Tribe, the court found that the limitation of tribal immunity in the relevant section of the IGRA only 
applied if there was a tribal-state compact. Id. Since no compact existed, the state had no authority to 
sue the Tribe because there was no abrogation of the Tribe’s immunity from suit. Id. Notably, the 
court also found that tribal immunity can be asserted in lawsuits seeking equitable relief, further illus-
trating the broad protection afforded by tribal immunity. Id. at 1244–45. 
 104 See id. at 1245 (finding that only Congress has the ability to limit the scope of tribal immunity 
and that any such abrogation must be clearly expressed); CANBY, supra note 35, at 107 (explaining that 
although Congress can waive tribal immunity, any such limitation must be plainly communicated). 
 105 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028 (finding that the IGRA did not limit the tribe’s 
ability to assert immunity in the case). The Bay Mills Indian Community is a tribal organization locat-
ed in Michigan. Bay Mills Indian Community: Who We Are, BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY, 
http://www.Baymills.org/about-us.php [http://perma.cc/3F4T-DWAU] (providing a brief overview of 
the Bay Mills Indian Community). 
 106 Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2029. 
 107 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging 
violations of class III gaming regulations and tribal-state compacts); Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. at 2032 (stating that Michigan attempted to sue the tribe for violating the IGRA); Seminole Tribe, 
81 F.3d at 1242 (stating that Florida sued the Seminole Tribe, citing a violation of the IGRA). Recall 
that in Seminole Tribe, the state of Florida argued that the IGRA abrogated tribal immunity from suit 
even in the absence of a tribal-state compact under the IGRA. See 81 F.3d at 1239 (describing the 
state of Florida’s attempt to sue the Seminole Tribe for violating the IGRA despite the lack of a tribal-
state compact). In Bay Mills Indian Community, there was a tribal-state compact, so Michigan argued 
that the IGRA abrogated tribal immunity under the circumstances and thus allowed Michigan to sue 
the tribe. See 134 S. Ct. at 2029 (stating that Michigan entered into a tribal-state compact with Bay 
Mills pursuant to the IGRA). 
 108 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that the IGRA only expressly limits 
sovereign immunity for activities on Indian reservations). 
 109 See id. (finding that the IGRA did not abrogate the tribe’s ability to assert tribal immunity in 
an action arising off Indian land). 
 110 See id. (stating that Congress can limit tribal immunity through statute, but any such limitation 
must be made clearly in the statute). 
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These cases demonstrate that only Congress may limit the judicially cre-
ated doctrine of tribal immunity and courts are only willing to find such a limi-
tation when it is made expressly clear by statute.111 Moreover, although Con-
gress has the authority to abrogate tribal immunity, Congress has only done so 
in a few limited circumstances.112 
E. Jurisdiction to Hear Cases Involving American Indian Tribes 
Given that Indian tribes are independent political communities with tribal 
governments, it is unclear when a tribe may be sued in state or federal court 
and whether those courts have jurisdiction to even hear cases involving 
tribes.113 Even when a court seemingly has jurisdiction to hear a case based on 
the subject matter of the case or the location of the cause of action, the court 
may still lack jurisdiction because of tribal sovereign immunity.114 
Over time, Congress has enacted several statutes that specifically grant 
state or federal courts jurisdiction to hear causes of action that arise on Indian 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See id. (reasoning that Congress may limit a tribe’s immunity); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 
1242 (stating that Congress can limit tribal immunity, but Congress’s intent to create such a limitation 
must be clear); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 482 (explaining that Congressional waiver of 
tribal immunity must be clearly expressed). 
 112 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 483 (stating that congressional waivers of tribal im-
munity are rare); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (abrogating tribal immunity only for certain 
on-reservation gaming activities that are also in violation of tribal-state compacts); Bay Mills Indian 
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that the IGRA only limits tribal immunity in a narrow sense and re-
affirming that without express intent from Congress, tribal immunity is not limited); Kiowa, 523 U.S. 
at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the current precedent concerning tribal sovereign immuni-
ty allows immunity to be asserted against a tort victim, protecting the Tribe from suit even if the Tribe 
is culpable); Seminole Tribe, 81 F.3d at 1244–45 (reasoning that tribal immunity can be asserted in 
lawsuits pertaining to commercial activities as well as lawsuits seeking injunctions and other equitable 
relief). 
 113 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2015) (describing American Indian tribes as sovereign entities with federally recognized 
sovereign immunity); CANBY, supra note 35, at 139 (describing jurisdictional issues in the field of 
Indian law as one of the most “complex problems” in the field). See generally Honorable William C. 
Canby, Jr., Tribal Court, Federal Court, State Court: A Jurisdictional Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July 
1993, at 24 (providing a brief overview of the jurisdictional landscape concerning lawsuits involving 
Indian tribes). 
 114 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 140 (explaining that jurisdiction largely depends upon whether 
Indians are involved and the location in which the cause of action arises); see also Foxworthy, 169 
P.3d at 235 (finding that state court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving a private tort action 
against a tribe that occurred on an Indian reservation). Jurisdiction concerning lawsuits involving 
American Indians is a complex topic that largely turns on the specific cause of action alleged in the 
suit, the geographic region in which the lawsuit arises, and whether a tribal court has original jurisdic-
tion over the suit. See generally Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on Indian Reserva-
tions: Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 71, 72–74 (1992) 
(providing a brief overview of the differences between federal jurisdiction, tribal jurisdiction, and 
state jurisdiction). 
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reservations.115 Congress has largely granted federal courts jurisdiction to ad-
judicate criminal offenses involving Indian tribes, and state courts have been 
given jurisdiction over criminal offenses that occur off Indian lands.116 In con-
trast, civil jurisdiction is more limited, as a state may only assume civil juris-
diction if the tribe expressly consents to it.117 Thus, depending on the nature of 
the claim and geographic region in which the suit arises, either a state court or 
federal court can be a proper forum.118 
Importantly however, tribal immunity from suit may still warrant dismis-
sal of a civil action against Indian tribes.119 For example, in Bay Mills Indian 
Community, the state of Michigan properly filed suit in federal court against 
the Bay Mills Indian Community claiming a violation of the IGRA under fed-
eral law.120 Although the IGRA does grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012) (extending major United States criminal laws to offenses com-
mitted by or against American Indians and subjecting such criminal offenses to federal court jurisdic-
tion); Id. § 1162 (granting certain state courts jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or 
against Indians on reservations); 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (granting state courts jurisdiction to hear civil 
causes of action arising on Indian reservations and involving American Indians when agreed to by the 
Indian tribe); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (granting specific state courts jurisdiction to hear civil actions that 
arise on Indian reservations and concern individual American Indians). But see Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (finding that Arizona State Court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil ac-
tion that arose on Indian territory concerning a non-Indian and an Indian). These statutes use the term 
“Indian country” to denote Indian reservation land. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (providing the definition of 
“Indian country” as used in the statute); see also CANBY, supra note 35, at 149–69 (providing a histor-
ical overview of the development of American Indian jurisdiction and the relationship to United States 
federal and state governments). 
 116 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (granting United States courts jurisdiction over criminal offenses that 
occur on Indian territory); 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (granting state courts jurisdiction over criminal cases 
concerning tribes when the tribe consents to suit in the state); CANBY, supra note 35, at 170, 198–99 
(stating that there are several federal criminal statutes that apply to all persons regardless of location 
within the United States, and state courts can exert jurisdiction over anyone for criminal offenses that 
occur within the state, but not in causes of action that arise between Indians on Indian lands). 
 117 See 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (granting state courts jurisdiction to hear civil actions arising in the state 
only when the tribe agrees to state jurisdiction). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (granting specific states 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action that arise on Indian land); CANBY, supra note 35, at 207–08, 
271 (explaining that generally, a state cannot assume civil jurisdiction in actions arising on Indian 
lands except under 28 U.S.C. § 1360, commonly referred to as Public Law 280, which provides cer-
tain states the ability to assume civil jurisdiction in actions against Indians on Indian lands). 
 118 CANBY, supra note 35, at 140 (asserting that a court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction in Indian 
affairs largely depends upon whether Indians are involved and the location in which the cause of ac-
tion arises); see Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2029 (showing that Michigan sued the Indian 
tribe in federal court for a claim arising out of federal law); Foxworthy, 169 P.3d at 54 (illustrating a 
case in which an Indian tribe was sued in state court under a state law). 
 119 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that the Indian tribe could not be sued 
in the action involving an off-reservation transaction because of tribal immunity); Foxworthy, 169 
P.3d at 54 (reasoning that an Indian tribe could not be sued in the civil action that arose out of an 
incident that occurred off the Indian reservation). 
 120 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (granting a state the right to sue an Indian tribe under specific 
circumstances); Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028 (illustrating Michigan suing the Bay Mills 
Indian Community in federal court in accordance with the IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)). 
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cases involving Indian tribes and the IGRA, such jurisdiction is still subject to 
tribal immunity and therefore the lawsuit must be dismissed when appropri-
ate.121 In interpreting the IGRA, the court in Bay Mills Indian Community con-
cluded that although the IGRA provides jurisdiction to federal courts to hear 
certain claims, the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the particular claim 
alleged in Bay Mills Indian Community because tribal immunity was not abro-
gated.122 Understanding where a Native American Indian tribe may be sued is 
thus an important and complicated issue, but even when one thinks a suit is 
properly filed, tribal immunity can result in immediate dismissal of a lawsuit 
against a tribe even when the tribe is culpable.123 
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ESCAPING LITIGATION 
The law governing American Indian tribal sovereign immunity has creat-
ed a powerful means of avoiding lawsuits when an American Indian tribe is a 
party to the lawsuit.124 Furthermore, given an almost unlimited ability to assert 
immunity from suit, the American Indian tribes have become a means by 
which an individual can avoid a lawsuit by engaging in an agreement with a 
tribe.125 Although originally created almost accidentally by defining a court’s 
                                                                                                                           
 121 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii); see Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that 
tribal immunity was properly asserted and therefore the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
lawsuit); Lynn H. Slade et al., Supreme Court Affirms Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Does Not Abro-
gate Sovereign Immunity for Suit Alleging Illegal Gaming Occurring on Non-Indian Lands, LEXOLO-
GY (June 17, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7ea354ad-b36a-4ea6-948d-
27a82c8aaeb5 [http://perma.cc/8UMS-JADC] (stating that the IGRA did not limit the tribe’s ability to 
assert tribal immunity, and therefore the lawsuit against the tribe was dismissed). 
 122 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that the IGRA did not abrogate tribal 
immunity where the action involved off-reservation gaming activity). 
 123 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 100 (explaining that tribal immunity may be properly asserted in 
state and federal court, resulting in dismissal of a case); see also Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 
2039 (stating that Michigan must find alternative means to settle the dispute with the Bay Mills Indian 
Community, implying that federal courts have no jurisdiction to render a judgment in the case). 
 124 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 100 (stating that tribal immunity may be asserted in state and 
federal courts, in actions seeking monetary damages, and in actions seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief). 
 125 See Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (describing a situation in which tribal immunity can be used 
to “gam[e] the system”); Thomas, supra note 1 (describing a way in which one could avoid a lawsuit 
by entering into an agreement with an American Indian tribe); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039 (2014) (finding that the Bay Mills Indian tribe could not be sued having 
properly asserted sovereign immunity); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 
(1998) (stating that the Kiowa Tribe had sovereign immunity from suit, and therefore the lawsuit 
against the tribe was dismissed); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. World 
Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890–91 (1986) (concluding that the Indian tribes could not be sued because of 
tribal sovereign immunity); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (finding that the 
Santa Clara Pueblo tribe could not be sued because of tribal sovereign immunity); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) (finding that tribal sovereign immunity grants 
the Tribe immunity from suit in an action seeking an injunction to prevent the tribe from fishing); 
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jurisdiction over American Indian tribes, tribal sovereign immunity has grown 
to provide a shelter for both the Indian tribes and other individuals seeking to 
escape litigation.126 
A. The Unreasonable Scope of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Tribal sovereign immunity affords tribes broad protection.127 Although 
Congress has placed some limits on the use of tribal immunity by passing spe-
cific statutes, there has been no extensive reform in the law limiting the scope 
of protection.128 Given the broad application of tribal sovereign immunity, 
tribal governments can avoid lawsuits in numerous cases in which others 
would likely be found liable, particularly in civil actions.129 
Justice Stevens drew attention to this problem in his dissent in Kiowa.130 
There, Justice Stevens highlighted the inequality that the law provides to Indi-
an tribes by providing a means of escaping liability.131 Even when a tribe is 
clearly at fault in the matter, such as defaulting on a promissory note in the 
                                                                                                                           
Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Seminole 
Tribe of Florida properly asserted tribal sovereign immunity and thus could not be sued). 
 126 See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, Accident, and Policy 
in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 779 (2008) (de-
scribing tribal sovereign immunity as broad); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756 (stating that the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity was created “almost by accident”); Turner v. United States, 248 
U.S. 354, 358 (1919) (reasoning that an Indian tribe cannot be sued without consent); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (finding that American Indian tribes are recognized to be 
sovereign independent communities yet still subject to American federal law). But see Wood, supra 
note 7, at 1588–89 (arguing that the creation of tribal sovereign immunity was not merely an acci-
dent). 
 127 Florey, supra note 126, at 779. 
 128 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) (granting certain states jurisdiction over criminal offenses that 
take place on Indian reservations); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (“IGRA”) 
(illustrating a federal statute that limits tribal immunity in very specific instances related to gaming 
activity); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 483 (stating that Congress has rarely placed limits on 
tribal immunity). 
 129 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (reversing the decision of the lower court by finding that the 
Tribe’s failure to pay a promissory note could not be litigated in court because of tribal sovereign 
immunity); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. at 167–68 (finding that state law limiting the amount of 
fishing did not apply to the Tribe because the Tribe exercised sovereign immunity); Navajo Nation v. 
Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1218 (10th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Navajo Nation tribe cannot be sued 
for tort liability following a slip-and-fall that resulted in injury at the tribe’s casino); Seneca Tel. Co. 
v. Miami Tribe, 253 P.3d 53, 55-57 (Okla. 2011) (finding that despite the negligent conduct of the 
Tribe, the Tribe could not be sued because of tribal immunity). 
 130 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (stating that the doctrine of tribal sover-
eign immunity is “unjust,” and Indian tribes should be held accountable when they are at fault). 
 131 See id. (describing how tribal immunity tends to leave a plaintiff asserting actions against a 
tribe worse off as the plaintiff often has no means to attain a remedy, particularly in the context of 
civil tort actions). 
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case of Kiowa, the tribe is able to escape judgment by invoking immunity.132 
Such a decision sends a message of caution to those seeking to enter into 
agreements with tribes as well as anyone who may file a civil action against a 
tribe.133 
To illustrate the strong protection of tribal immunity as it currently exists, 
consider the case of Seneca Telephone Company v. Miami Tribe.134 In Seneca, 
the Miami Tribe was conducting excavation work on Indian land when they 
damaged underground telephone lines owned by Seneca Telephone Compa-
ny.135 Seneca sued the Tribe in state court for negligence seeking monetary 
damages for the repairs as well as attorney’s fees.136 It was undisputed that the 
Miami Tribe was negligent and directly caused the damage done to the Seneca 
telephone lines, resulting in necessary repair costs.137 Despite this, the court 
reasoned that the Miami Tribe properly asserted tribal immunity, and therefore 
the lawsuit must be dismissed leaving Seneca without a remedy.138 
In addition to Seneca, which highlights the injustice caused by tribal im-
munity in a commercial context, consider the tragic events leading to the 
wrongful death claim in Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.139 In Furry, 
Tatiana Furry was served copious amounts of alcohol at the Miccosukee Resort 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See id. at 760 (finding that the Kiowa Tribe was immune from suit in an action against them 
for defaulting on a promissory note); see also Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–56 (dismissing an action against 
a tribe because of tribal immunity despite evidence that the tribe was culpable). 
 133 See Galanda, supra note 5, at 50, 52 (highlighting the extensive nature of tribal sovereign 
immunity and advising lawyers to understand such implications prior to doing business with an Indian 
tribe); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (implying that without an express waiver of immunity, those 
seeking civil remedies against an Indian tribe will not be successful as the tribe may assert immunity 
from suit); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1242 (finding that a civil action to enjoin a tribe from partak-
ing in certain gaming activities could not be brought without express waiver of tribal sovereign im-
munity); Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–56 (explaining that tribal sovereign immunity can often leave an 
injured innocent plaintiff without a means to obtain a remedy). 
 134 See Seneca, 253 P.3d at 56–57 (reversing the lower court’s finding of fault on behalf of the 
Miami Tribe and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the lawsuit because of tribal im-
munity despite evidence of the Tribe’s negligence in causing damage). 
 135 Id. at 54. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. at 55 (acknowledging that the company’s assertions of negligence against the Tribe 
have merit). 
 138 See id. (finding that there was no waiver of tribal immunity and therefore the lawsuit against 
the Tribe must be dismissed). The court in Seneca expressly recognized the unjust position that the 
Seneca company was in, having no means to recover from the negligence of the Tribe. See id. (stating 
that although the allegations of negligence against the Tribe were appropriate, tribal immunity pro-
tected the Tribe from liability). The court even expressly called on Congress to pass legislation allow-
ing the state court to hold the Tribe liable in such cases. Id. at 56. 
 139 See Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 685 F.3d 1224, 1226 (11th Cir. 2013) (highlighting 
a case in which a plaintiff sought relief in a wrongful death action that arose out of events that oc-
curred on Indian land); Seneca, 253 P.3d at 56 (illustrating a case where a tribe was immune from suit 
even though the tribe was clearly negligent in causing damage to a company’s property). 
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& Gaming facility located in Miami, Florida.140 Employees of the resort then 
witnessed Furry get into her car while she was visibly intoxicated.141 Furry 
subsequently got into a car accident resulting in her death.142 Furry’s father 
filed suit against the Miccosukee Tribe citing various negligence claims and a 
violation of Florida’s Dram Shop laws.143 Although any non-Indian owned bar 
would likely have to litigate this case and potentially face liability, the court 
found that the lawsuit against the Miccosukee Tribe could not be maintained 
because of tribal sovereign immunity.144 
Not only does tribal sovereign immunity pose a problem for those seeking 
relief for actions that occurred on Indian reservations, but the doctrine also 
protects tribes in lawsuits that arise completely independent of tribal lands fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiowa.145 The precedent set by Kiowa 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See Furry, 685 F.3d at 1226–27 (stating that Furry was served copious amounts of alcohol by 
servers of the Miccosukee Resort). 
 141 See id. at 1226–27, 1226 n.2 (reciting the facts of the case and finding the facts true as al-
leged). The facts also state that defendant Miccosukee knew Furry had an alcohol abuse problem, 
having served Furry alcohol numerous times prior to the night of the incident. Id. at 1227. 
 142 Id. at 1227. Furry was involved in a fatal car accident likely due to her intoxication, where she 
had a blood alcohol of .32, four times the legal limit of .08 in Florida. Id. 
 143 Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2017) (stating that anyone who knowingly sells alcohol to a 
person habitually addicted to alcohol may be held liable for any resulting injury or damage caused by 
that person while intoxicated). 
 144 Jon Tayler, Miccosukee Tribe Again Avoids Lawsuit Over Fatal 2009 Car Crash, MIAMI NEW 
TIMES (Jul. 20, 2012), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miccosukee-tribe-again-avoids-lawsuit-
over-fatal-2009-car-crash-6520502 [http://perma.cc/9BK8-8NDV]; see Furry, 685 F.3d at 1236–37 
(finding that tribal sovereign immunity was properly asserted by the Miccosukee Tribe because there 
was no waiver or abrogation of tribal immunity, yet stating the facts of the case weighed heavily 
against the Tribe). The court bases much of its reasoning on Kiowa, finding that without express 
waiver or congressional action, the Indian tribe cannot be sued in the state court under state civil law. 
See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (stating that a limitation of tribal immunity through statute must be ex-
press and clear); Furry, 685 F.3d at 1236 (finding no express limitation of tribal immunity and there-
fore tribal immunity could properly be asserted). It is likely that if the bar in Furry was not operated 
by an Indian tribe, and thus could not assert tribal immunity, the court may have found the bar liable 
for Furry’s death. Compare Furry, 685 F.3d at 1227 (reciting facts that suggest the Miccosukee Tribe 
knew that the deceased was a habitual drinker and therefore the Tribe could be liable under §768.125 
of the Florida Statutes), with Peoples Restaurant v. Sabo, 591 So.2d 907, 908 (1991) (affirming a 
denial of summary judgment because, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that a 
bar violated section 768.125 of the Florida Statutes by over-serving alcohol to a known habitual alco-
hol drinker, and therefore a question of material fact existed). Moreover, in Furry, the court states that 
tribal sovereign immunity is outdated and overbroad, especially given the complex and sophisticated 
business of Indian gaming. See 685 F.3d at 1237 (calling tribal sovereign immunity “anachronistic”). 
Yet without new direction from the Supreme Court or congressional action, the court upheld prece-
dent, dismissing the claim against the Miccosukee Tribe. Id. 
 145 CANBY, supra note 35, at 99 (explaining that tribal immunity can be properly asserted in law-
suits concerning actions that occur off Indian lands); see Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 
(upholding the decision in Kiowa); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758 (finding that tribal sovereign immunity is 
not limited to cases involving off-reservation commercial transactions); Furry, 685 F.3d at 1237 (il-
lustrating a case in which a plaintiff sought damages against a tribe for activities that took place on the 
Indian reservation). 
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thus has an immense impact on one’s ability to recover in actions against an 
Indian tribe even when the lawsuit arises from a dispute entirely separate from 
an Indian reservation.146 
To illustrate this, consider Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in which 
a plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Mashantucket Tribe for copyright in-
fringement.147 In Bassett, the plaintiff filed an action alleging copyright in-
fringement for the Tribe’s use of a movie that the plaintiff originally helped 
create.148 Regardless of the merits of the action, the court determined that the 
Mashantucket Tribe could not be sued under federal copyright law because of 
tribal sovereign immunity.149 Consequently, the plaintiff had no course of ac-
tion against the tribe, unable to even litigate the merits of the claim.150 The 
Bassett copyright infringement suit demonstrates the broad protection of tribal 
immunity and how it can be asserted in cases that do not relate to tribal lands, 
yet still result in dismissal of a case.151 
B. Questions Remain: Can Tribal Immunity Become Even Broader? 
Although numerous cases have been decided with respect to tribal sover-
eign immunity, many of which have resulted in dismissal, there are still unset-
tled questions surrounding tribal immunity and when it can be properly assert-
ed.152 In Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, the plaintiff sued the Upper 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (finding that even though the Kiowa Tribe defaulted on a promis-
sory note involving off-reservation land, plaintiffs still could not recover because the Tribe asserted 
immunity from suit); CANBY, supra note 35, at 99 (stating that tribal immunity can be properly assert-
ed in actions arising on and off Indian lands). 
 147 See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
Tribe could not be sued under federal copyright law because of tribal immunity). 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. at 357–58 (finding that tribes cannot be sued under copyright law because there is no 
congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity in copyright infringement actions); see also 17 
U.S.C. ch. 5 (2012) (providing remedies a plaintiff can seek under federal copyright law). The court 
reasoned that nothing in the federal Copyright Act limited tribal immunity, and there was no tribal 
waiver of immunity in this case. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 357–58 (concluding no abrogation of tribal 
immunity in federal copyright statutes). 
 150 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 357–58. Since the plaintiff could not bring a copyright action against the 
Tribe because of tribal immunity, the case was dismissed. See id. (affirming the lower court’s dismis-
sal but due to tribal immunity, as opposed to the lower court’s reasoning). 
 151 See id. (dismissing a lawsuit based on the copyright act, which involved actions of the Tribe 
independent of tribal lands); see also CANBY, supra note 35, at 99 (stating that tribal immunity can be 
properly asserted in commercial or non-commercial activities on or off reservation lands). 
 152 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (dismissing a lawsuit because tribal immunity granted immunity 
from suit); Furry, 685 F.3d at 1237 (finding that tribal sovereign immunity required dismissal of the 
case). But see Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569, 576 (Wash. 2017) (finding that 
tribal sovereign immunity could not be properly asserted and therefore did not warrant dismissal in 
favor of the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 (2018) (vacating and remand-
ing to the Washington State Supreme Court); CANBY, supra note 35, at 100–01 (explaining that there 
is disagreement as to whether a tribe can assert immunity if subpoenaed in a federal criminal case, and 
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Skagit Tribe seeking to quiet title, claiming adverse possession of property.153 
The land dispute involved a plot of land owned by the plaintiff’s family, which 
invaded upon a portion of land more recently purchased by the Upper Skagit 
Tribe.154 The plaintiffs properly asserted that adverse possession had ripened 
under Washington State law, and therefore the Upper Skagit Tribe could no 
longer claim property rights to the land in question.155 The Upper Skagit Tribe 
filed a motion to dismiss, however, arguing that the Tribe enjoyed tribal sover-
eign immunity and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the 
adverse possession claim.156 Although the plaintiffs admitted that there is no 
clear abrogation of tribal immunity or waiver of immunity, they argued that the 
court may exercise jurisdiction in this case because jurisdiction is only sought 
over the land itself, not the Tribe.157 
The Washington State Supreme Court concluded that the court need not 
have personal jurisdiction over the Tribe; in rem jurisdiction over the land was 
sufficient for the court to exercise jurisdiction in the case and make a ruling.158 
In other words, the court did not need to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe in 
order to make a ruling concerning the disputed land within the state’s bor-
ders.159 Following this decision, the Upper Skagit Tribe appealed to the United 
                                                                                                                           
it is unclear whether immunity can be asserted in an in rem action concerning tribe-owned land not 
located on an Indian reservation). A subpoena is an order directing an individual to appear before a 
judge or tribunal, and one’s failure to comply can result in a penalty. Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In rem jurisdiction is jurisdiction over pieces of property, as opposed to 
jurisdiction over the persons party to the suit. In Rem Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
 153 Lundgren, 389 P.3d at 571. An action to quiet title is a proceeding in which a plaintiff seeks to 
establish rights to land by compelling an adverse claimant to either file claims against the land immi-
nently or forfeit any possible future claims. Action to Quiet Title, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). Adverse possession is a doctrine that allows an individual to assert property rights against a 
true owner of property when the adverse possessor make use of the land in a “continuous, exclusive, 
hostile, open, and notorious” way after a requisite period of time. Adverse Possession, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 154 Lundgren, 389 P.3d at 571–72. 
 155 Id. at 576. In Washington State, adverse possession of land succeeds when there is “(1) open 
and notorious, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) exclusive, and (4) hostile” use of the land for ten 
years. Id. at 575. The trial judge stated the plaintiffs successfully made out adverse possession, noting 
that the facts of the case were “as clear as a case” as the judge had seen. Id. at 576. 
 156 Id. at 572. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. at 572–73 (finding that the court wasn’t seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the Tribe; the court was only exercising jurisdiction over the land itself). In rem jurisdiction is a 
court’s jurisdiction over pieces of property. In Rem Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). The court delved further into the issues presented in this case, including whether the court 
necessarily had to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe in order to make a ruling on the land owned by 
the Tribe. See Lundgren, 389 P.3d at 576 (finding that the Tribe was not an essential party in the case 
because adverse possession ripened, and therefore the court was not exercising jurisdiction over the 
Tribe). 
 159 See Lundgren, 389 P.3d at 576 (reasoning that in rem jurisdiction was sufficient to make a 
ruling over the tribal owned land). 
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State Supreme Court to determine whether a state may exercise jurisdiction 
over in rem property despite tribal sovereign immunity.160 
At the Supreme Court the parties raised a new argument, which the Court 
chose not to rule on, resulting in the Court vacating and remanding the case to 
the Washington State Supreme Court.161 The new argument centered upon the 
theory that a tribe may not assert immunity over “immovable property” that 
exists in the territory of another sovereign, in this case the United States.162 
Although the Supreme Court could have decided the case on this issue, the 
Court instead chose to remand it, skirting another opportunity to examine the 
boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity and potentially limit its scope.163 
C. Outsiders Can Exploit Tribal Immunity Too 
Although tribal sovereign immunity is specifically conferred to Native 
American Indian tribes, it is possible for outsiders to take advantage of tribal 
immunity and immunity from suit.164 To best illustrate this, consider facts 
similar to the Allergan deal, where a pharmaceutical company sold its patents 
to a Native American Indian tribe.165 
In patent law, parties may file civil actions against patent owners in order 
to invalidate a patent, thereby allowing anyone to practice the patent.166 In 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See generally Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (reviewing the Washington State 
Supreme Court decision on appeal). 
 161 See id. at 1653, 1655 (vacating and remanding the case because new grounds were raised on 
appeal, which the Court left for consideration by the Washington State Supreme Court). 
 162 See id. 1653–54 (stating that the plaintiffs sought to have the Court rule in their favor based 
upon the theory that the Upper Skagit Tribe may not assert immunity over immovable property that is 
found within the boundaries of another sovereign). 
 163 See generally id. (providing a case in which the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review 
the scope of tribal sovereign immunity yet declined to do so); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (reviewing the 
scope of tribal immunity); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. at 167–68 (analyzing the boundaries of tribal 
sovereign immunity). 
 164 See Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (describing a deal between the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe of 
New York and Allergan that theoretically would allow Allergan to escape a lawsuit over their patent-
ed drug and a way to “gam[e] the system”). The Allergan deal did not actually prevent a lawsuit be-
cause the agreement between Allergan and the Tribe occurred after a lawsuit was already filed, but 
had the agreement been completed before the lawsuit started, it may have prevented the lawsuit alto-
gether. See Allergan, Inc., v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at 
*4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (declining to address the issue of Allergan’s agreement with the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe because the agreement occurred after the lawsuit had been filed). For the pur-
poses of this Note, the term “outsiders” refers to individuals who are not part of a Native American 
Indian tribe. 
 165 See Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (describing how Allergan sold their patent to the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe presumably in an attempt to invoke sovereign immunity in the pending litiga-
tion); Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (describing a scenario in which an outsider made a deal with a 
tribe to avoid a lawsuit). 
 166 See John M. Augustyn, Two Paths to Invalidate a U.S. Patent, 159 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 236 
(2013) (describing two ways to invalidate a patent, one of which is to file an action in federal court). 
A patent may also be invalidated through an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding at the Patent Trial 
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light of this, one can imagine a scenario similar to the Allergan case in which a 
pharmaceutical company is aware that a competing company is going to file an 
action seeking to invalidate a competitor’s patents.167 Because such actions are 
filed against the patent owner, one might ask what would happen if prior to the 
patent invalidity lawsuit, the patent owner sold the patents to a Native Ameri-
can Indian tribe, thus making the tribe the owner of the patents.168 If a third-
party then seeks to file a patent invalidity action in federal court, the party 
would have to file suit against the tribe.169 
                                                                                                                           
and Appeal Board, part of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See Inter Partes Review, 
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-
partes-review [http://perma.cc/A7A3-E794] (describing the inter partes review trial proceeding). Pa-
tents may be found invalid for numerous reasons, such as obviousness or lack of utility. See JOHN 
GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 8.1 (2017) (stating that in order to have a valid 
patent, the patent must be nonobvious and must demonstrate utility); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Teva Pharm., Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that a patent was invalid be-
cause it was obvious); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1275 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (stating that Research & Diagnostics filed a claim seeking to invalidate Streck patents). The 
complexities of patent law are beyond the scope of this Note. See generally MILLS supra (providing  a 
primer on patent law). 
 167 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 752 F.3d at 969 (illustrating a case in which a competing pharma-
ceutical company seeks to invalidate a competitor’s patent); Ron Zapata, Circuit Reaffirms Invalidity 
of Pfizer’s Norvasc Patent, LAW360 (June 5, 2007) https://www.law360.com/articles/26192/circuit-
reaffirms-invalidity-of-pfizer-s-norvasc-patent [http://perma.cc/LTE8-NKFM] (describing a lawsuit 
filed against a pharmaceutical company by a competing pharmaceutical company seeking to invalidate 
a patent). The Allergan case also involved an IPR proceeding at the United States Patent Office, in 
which the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe sought dismissal of the IPR citing tribal sovereign immunity. 
See generally St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reviewing 
the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to deny dismissal of the IPR following 
the transfer of Allergan’s patents to the Tribe). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit determined that because an IPR is an administrative proceeding, tribal immunity cannot be 
asserted. See Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (finding that tribal immunity cannot be used as a 
means to dismiss an IPR proceeding). Note that although this decision addresses the use of tribal im-
munity in an IPR proceeding, it does not address whether tribal immunity will result in dismissal of a 
civil action to invalidate a patent, which is the scenario highlighted in the presented hypothetical. See 
id. (stating that tribal immunity cannot be asserted in an IPR to dismiss an IPR proceeding). 
 168 See Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (describing how Allergan sold their patent to the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe presumably in an attempt to invoke sovereign immunity in the pending litiga-
tion); MILLS, supra note 166, § 17.4 (explaining that a patent owner must be party to a lawsuit seeking 
to invalidate its patent). In such a transaction, one can imagine that the deal between the original pa-
tent owner and the tribe is mutually beneficial, giving an exclusive right to the original patent owner 
to practice the patent, but also giving substantial revenue from the patent to the tribe. See Allergan, 
2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (describing the Allergan deal in which Allergan sold their patents to the 
Tribe and in return was granted an exclusive right to practice the patents). An exclusive license grants 
the licensee the right to perform the licensed act and excludes all others from performing the licensed 
act, including the licensor. Exclusive License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 169 See MILLS, supra note 166, § 17.4 (stating that a patent owner must be part of a lawsuit seek-
ing to render its patent invalid); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (finding that although it would be 
proper to bring suit against the Kiowa Tribe as party to the contract, the Tribe could not be sued be-
cause of tribal sovereign immunity); Bristol-Myers Squibb, 752 F.3d at 969 (illustrating that a party 
must sue the patent owner in a claim alleging patent invalidity). 
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Based on the precedent of tribal sovereign immunity and recent court de-
cisions, one would expect that the tribe would be able to assert tribal immunity 
in the patent invalidity lawsuit.170 There is currently no limitation of tribal sov-
ereign immunity concerning civil patent invalidity actions, and presumably the 
tribe would not waive their immunity in such a case.171 As a result, the patent 
action would most likely be dismissed because of tribal immunity.172 The sce-
nario thus illustrates how the original patent holder, a complete outsider, could 
leverage tribal sovereign immunity and avoid a lawsuit.173 
Although the patent case provides a good illustration of how an outsider 
can take advantage of tribal sovereign immunity, one can imagine other law-
suits in which a similar transaction could provide an escape from litigation.174 
As a simple illustration using property law, a hypothetical situation could con-
sist of an outsider running into a major issue building a new commercial build-
ing.175 For example in Ware v. Polk, a builder failed to obtain the requisite 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (stating that the court will not limit tribal im-
munity without express intent to do so from Congress); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding that Indian 
tribes are immune from suits that concern off-reservation commercial activity unless there is authori-
zation from Congress or a waiver of immunity); Bassett, 204 F.3d at 358 (finding that a tribe could 
not be sued under federal copyright law having properly asserted tribal sovereign immunity); see also 
CANBY, supra note 35, at 99–100 (explaining that tribal sovereign immunity extends to actions in 
federal and state court concerning commercial or non-commercial activities on or off tribal lands). 
 171 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (listing defenses available in a patent invalidity action, with no 
language mentioning Native American Indians or tribal immunity); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (stating 
that a tribe may consent to suit, waiving tribal immunity); John P. Ahlers, Protecting Your Interests 
While Contracting with Sovereign Nations, AHLERS, CRESSMAN, & SLEIGHT (Aug. 23, 2011), https://
www.acslawyers.com/protecting-your-interests-while-contracting-with-sovereign-nations/ [http://
perma.cc/L4CB-56ZA] (stating that tribal immunity affords strong protection from suit to Indian 
tribes, and such immunity can only be abrogated by Congress or waived by the tribe itself). 
 172 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (explaining that a court will not limit the scope 
of tribal immunity without express intent from Congress); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760 (finding proper 
assertion of tribal immunity in cases concerning off-reservation commercial activity unless there is 
express authorization from Congress or the tribe waives immunity); Bassett, 204 F.3d at 358 (finding 
that tribal immunity afforded a tribe immunity from suit in an action under federal copyright law). 
 173 See Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (implying that tribal immunity can be used to effectively 
avoid a lawsuit). In Allergan, the judge expressed doubts that such a tactic would prove effective; 
however, the issue was not adjudicated, leaving open the door that the strategy could work. See Aller-
gan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3. In such a transaction, one would expect the original patent holder to 
receive an exclusive right to practice the patent from the tribe so that the original owner could still 
profit from the patent. See id. at *1 (describing that Allergan received an exclusive license to practice 
the patents from the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe). In the event that a civil action did result in dismissal 
because of tribal immunity, the filing party could instead file for an IPR proceeding at the USPTO, 
which is not subject to tribal immunity concerns. See Mylan, 896 F.3d at 1326 (finding that tribal 
immunity cannot be asserted in an IPR proceeding). 
 174 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (finding that tribal sovereign immunity prevented a lawsuit con-
cerning a breach of contract); CANBY, supra note 35, at 99–100 (stating that tribal immunity extends 
to a broad range of commercial activities on or off Indian reservation lands, and it can protect a tribe 
from monetary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief in a variety of circumstances). 
 175 See Ware v. Polk Cty., 918 So.2d 977, 978 (describing a situation in which an individual began 
building a structure without first securing the requisite permits, violating the local building codes). 
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building permits, violating the local building codes.176 Hypothetically the 
builder, knowing that the city is going to file a lawsuit against him or her con-
cerning the property, can enter into a favorable deal with a native tribe granting 
all rights in the property to the tribe.177 In light of Bay Mills Indian Community 
and Kiowa, it seems that the city would have little recourse against the tribe as 
the new owners of the property, now able to assert tribal sovereign immunity.178 
III. FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM 
Given these troubling cases and seemingly unjust outcomes, it is worth-
while to look back at the foundation of tribal sovereign immunity and why 
there have been few limitations to it.179 The doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity was founded upon the idea that unlike the states of the United States, 
the Native American Indian tribes did not have an opportunity to negotiate the 
formation of the United States or play any role in the creation of the Union.180 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. 
 177 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (finding that tribal immunity may be asserted 
in causes of action arising off Indian reservations); Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (describing a trans-
action between an outsider and a tribe, which tried to leverage the tribe’s sovereign immunity). The 
specifics of such a transaction and the relevant law concerning such a transaction are beyond the scope 
of this Note, but the described hypothetical merely presents a possible scenario in which an individual 
could sell property prior to a lawsuit in order to escape the lawsuit. See CANBY, supra note 35, at 100–
01 (noting that tribal immunity can extend to commercial actions arising on or off Indian reservation 
land, however it is unclear whether a state court can assert in rem jurisdiction over land outside of an 
Indian reservation, preventing a tribe from asserting immunity); see also Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 
138 S. Ct. at 1654 (suggesting that immovable property located on the territory of another sovereign 
may not be subject to tribal immunity concerns). 
 178 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2038 (stating that tribal immunity can only be abro-
gated by statute from Congress); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (finding that tribal immunity was properly 
asserted and therefore warranted dismissal of the case); see also CANBY, supra note 35, at 100–01 
(illustrating the numerous instances in which tribal immunity could be asserted, thus leaving a plain-
tiff without a remedy). 
 179 See Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 685 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
tribal immunity precluded suit against a tribe for possibly over serving a habitual alcohol drinker, 
leading to the drinker’s death); Seneca Tel. Co. v. Miami Tribe, 253 P.3d 53, 57 (Okla. 2011) (finding 
that a tribe could not be sued despite its clear negligence in causing damage to a company’s under-
ground telephone wires); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 483 (stating that Congress has rarely 
acted to limit tribal sovereign immunity, resulting in few limitations on tribal immunity). 
 180 See MICHAEL L. OBERG, NATIVE AMERICA: A HISTORY 133 (2d. ed. 2018) (describing the 
Constitutional Convention and lack of discussion concerning the Native American Indians, affirming 
the idea that the new federal government would regulate Indian affairs); Wood, supra note 7, at 1597 
(explaining that tribes were not party to the formation of the union, having been absent from the crea-
tion of the Constitution); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) 
(rationalizing tribal immunity by asserting that the tribes did not have an opportunity to partake in the 
formation of the United States, and therefore the tribes could not have waived their immunity as did 
the states); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (stating that the native 
tribes were “not at the Constitutional Convention” as were the states, implying that the tribes had no 
say in the formation of the United States). As is well known in United States history, the Native 
American Indian tribes were repeatedly treated as lesser-individuals in the formation of the United 
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Since the native tribes did not have an opportunity to waive sovereignty and join 
the Union as the states did, courts have held that tribal sovereign immunity exists 
until waived by the tribes or abrogated by Congress.181 Because the courts are 
seemingly unwilling to disturb the precedent of tribal immunity and limit its 
scope, all focus turns to Congress to pass legislation limiting tribal immunity.182 
A. A Bipartisan Issue: Congress Needs to Limit Tribal Immunity 
In the wake of the media frenzy surrounding the Allergan patent deal with 
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, some members of Congress took notice of the 
issues surrounding tribal sovereign immunity.183 Senator Claire McCaskill in-
troduced a bill on October 5, 2017 to specifically limit a tribe’s ability to assert 
sovereign immunity in an inter partes review proceeding concerning the validi-
ty of a patent.184 While this bill has yet to become law, introduction of this bill 
                                                                                                                           
States, and excluded from discussions concerning the formation of the United States. See Kiowa, 523 
U.S. at 756 (explaining that because the tribes were not at the Constitutional Convention, the tribes 
could not relinquish their sovereignty as did the states); OBERG, supra (describing the hate that early 
American settlers had for native Indians, leading to war and significant Indian population decline). 
Native Americans played a major role in the formation of the United States, and recieved horrendous 
treatment during the rise of the United States. See generally OBERG, supra (providing an extensive 
overview of Native American history). 
 181 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756 (rationalizing tribal immunity by finding that the Native tribes 
could not waive their sovereignty as did the states, and therefore the tribes must still retain their sover-
eignty); CANBY, supra note 35, at 107, 109 (explaining that Congress can waive a tribe’s immunity, or 
a tribe can waive its own immunity); Wood, supra note 7, at 1597 (stating that tribes were not parties 
to the formation of the Constitution, and therefore did not waive their sovereignty). 
 182 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2039 (stating that only Congress has authority to 
abrogate tribal immunity); CANBY, supra note 35, at 99, 107 (explaining that the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the doctrine of tribal immunity in Bay Mills Indian Community, and Congress can act to limit a 
tribe’s ability to assert immunity). 
 183 See S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017) (proposing a bill to abrogate tribal immunity in patent 
claims); Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (illustrating that a popular news magazine took notice of the 
Allergan transaction); Thomas, supra note 1 (showing that a prominent newspaper covered the Aller-
gan patent deal). 
 184 See S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (proposing a bill to limit tribal sovereign immunity in certain 
patent claims). The bill specifically abrogates a tribe’s ability to assert sovereign immunity as a de-
fense to IPR conducted under 35 U.S.C. chapter 31. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012) (providing the 
relevant law concerning IPR, which Senator McCaskill’s proposed bill seeks to amend by prohibiting 
assertions of tribal immunity); S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (proposing a bill that would no longer allow a 
tribe to assert sovereign immunity). Because the bill extends to proceedings under 35 U.S.C. chapter 
31, which allows for an appeal to federal court, the bill would likely also limit the ability of a tribe to 
assert immunity in federal court claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (stating that a party unsatisfied with the 
decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may appeal to federal court). Senator Claire McCaskill 
is a democratic senator who has represented Missouri since 2006. About Claire, UNITED STATES 
SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/about-claire 
[http://perma.cc/PY8B-KJHS] (providing biographical information on Sen. Claire McCaskill). 
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in the Senate demonstrates that Congress has taken notice of the injustice that 
can be caused by tribal sovereign immunity.185 
A bill only seeking to limit tribal sovereign immunity in patent cases, 
however, is not enough.186 Courts throughout the United States have repeatedly 
stated that there is a need for change in the law with respect to tribal immunity, 
calling on Congress to narrow its scope.187 Unfortunately, Congress has yet to 
heed the advice of the courts, allowing tribal sovereign immunity to continue 
to serve as a powerful immunity from suit.188 In following the words of nu-
merous courts, it would be in the interest of the United States judicial system 
for Congress to enact legislation severely limiting cases in which tribal sover-
eign immunity may be asserted, particularly tort causes of action that arise on 
or off Indian lands.189 Where non-tribe members are involved, the United 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028 (finding that tribal immunity protected the tribe 
in a lawsuit involving off-reservation gaming); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (finding that tribal immunity 
granted immunity from suit in an action for breach of contract); Furry, 685 F.3d at 1226 (highlighting 
a case in which a plaintiff sought relief for events that occurred on Indian owned land); Bassett v. 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that the Tribe could not be 
sued under copyright law because of tribal immunity); S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (providing the text of 
the bill introduced in the Senate to limit tribal immunity); McCaskill to PhRMA: Are You Comfortable 
with Allergan’s Action with Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe?, UNITED STATES SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL 
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/mccaskill-to-phrma-are-
you-comfortable-with-allergans-action-with-saint-regis-mohawk-tribe [http://perma.cc/XH3H-
DMWR] (describing the Allergan patent deal as a loophole and something that should be made ille-
gal). 
 186 See S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (providing the text of a bill proposed in the United States Senate 
to limit tribal immunity patent actions arising under 35 U.S.C. chapter 31); CANBY, supra note 35, at 
99 (describing that tribal immunity can be used to prevent a lawsuit arising out of commercial and 
governmental activities that occur both on and off Indian reservations, showing that the scope of tribal 
immunity extends beyond just patent actions). 
 187 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2050–51 (5-4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the extension of tribal sovereign immunity to off-reservation activities is unfounded, 
resulting in inequities under the law); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
current precedent of tribal sovereign immunity allows Native American tribes to escape liability 
where others would be found liable). In his dissent in Kiowa, Justice Stevens highlights the issue of 
tort actions, where a tort victim will be unable to recover damages when tribal immunity is asserted. 
See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (noting that tort victims are not able to negotiate in such where tribal 
immunity is asserted); see also Furry, 685 F.3d at 1236–37 (stating that the current boundaries of 
tribal sovereign immunity are “anachronistic,” yet the law of tribal immunity will remain as such until 
Congress passes legislation to limit it). 
 188 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (IGRA) (illustrating a significant 
limitation to tribal sovereign immunity enacted by Congress, but only in the context of certain com-
mercial gaming activity); S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (illustrating a recent bill proposal in the Senate to 
limit tribal immunity, but only to patent claims); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 483 (finding 
that Congress has rarely acted to limit tribal immunity); Davidson, supra note 1, at 36 (showing that 
without some limitation of tribal immunity from Congress, individuals can continue to “gam[e] the 
system” by exploiting tribal immunity). 
 189 See Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2050–51 (5-4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(finding that tribal sovereign immunity created injustice under the law); Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (stating that tribal sovereign immunity can impose significant harm to injured tort 
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States courts must be able to exercise jurisdiction in order to adjudicate 
claims.190 Congress should therefore exercise its authority to enact a new stat-
ute that significantly narrows the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.191 Such a 
statute could read as follows: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an Indian tribe 
may not assert sovereign immunity as a defense in any action arising 
under the laws of the United States, or any State thereof, involving 
an individual who is not legally recognized as a member of said In-
dian tribe.192 
Although there remain arguments in favor of tribal immunity for use in 
limited circumstances such as when civil actions arise amongst members of 
Indian tribes, in the modern world tribal immunity no longer serves a purpose 
and instead acts to obstruct justice.193 No doubt the Native American Indian 
tribes have had a long and arduous history with the United States, but today, 
many tribes are economic powerhouses running complex million dollar com-
mercial businesses.194 Without new legislation from Congress limiting the 
                                                                                                                           
victims); Furry, 685 F.3d at 1236–37 (stating that the doctrine of tribal immunity today is “anachro-
nistic”); Seneca, 253 P.3d at 57 (illustrating the inequity of tribal immunity, barring recovery of an 
injured plaintiff despite clear culpability of a tribe). 
 190 See Furry, 685 F.3d at 1237 (illustrating a case where tribal immunity resulted in dismissal of 
a wrongful death action largely, yet the court noted that on the facts, the Tribe appeared culpable); 
Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–56 (illustrating a case where the court determined the Tribe was negligent, but 
the court could not render a judgment against the Tribe because of tribal immunity). 
 191 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 107 (stating that Congress has the authority to waive tribal sov-
ereign immunity, but any such waiver must be clearly expressed); see also Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 
134 S. Ct. at 2038 (stating that tribal immunity can only be limited by statute from Congress); Kiowa, 
523 U.S. at 754 (finding that tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and therefore only Congress 
may change the scope of tribal immunity). 
 192 See CANBY, supra note 35, at 107 (explaining that Congress can waive tribal sovereign im-
munity with express, unambiguous intent). 
 193 Compare Florey, supra note 126, at 826 (stating that there are justifications for tribal immuni-
ty), and Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1109 (explaining 
that tribal immunity provides an important protection for Native American Indian tribes that are often 
poverty-stricken and seeking to protect their tribal communities), with Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. at 2031 (rationalizing tribal immunity by asserting that the tribes did not have an opportunity to 
partake in the formation of the United States, and therefore the tribes could not have waived their 
immunity as did the states), Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that tribal im-
munity creates unjust outcomes), and Furry, 685 F.3d at 1236–37 (explaining that the current applica-
tion of tribal immunity is not appropriate in the modern world). 
 194 See Nick Sortal, Seminole Hard Rock Collects $579 Million-More Than Eight Racetrack Ca-
sinos Combined, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 11, 2017) http://www.miamiherald.com/entertainment/article
166085722.html [http://perma.cc/XH5X-KBEA] (finding that the Seminole Hard Rock Casino, owned 
by the Seminole Tribe, made $579 million for the 2016 fiscal year); Foxwoods Resort Casino Report 
May 2017 Slot Revenue, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20170615005675/en/Foxwoods-Resort-Casino-Reports-2017-Slot-Revenue [http://perma.cc/4HVY-
8SSU] (stating that the Foxwoods Casino, owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, brought in $38.1 
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scope of tribal immunity, tribes that are otherwise liable will continue to es-
cape judgment leaving injured parties without a remedy.195 
B. Some Good News: “Arm of the Tribe” Doctrine  
and Stopping Outsider Deals 
The issue raised regarding outsider deals to leverage a tribe’s immunity is 
concerning; however, some jurisdictions have started to place limits on asser-
tions of tribal immunity that significantly reduce the possibility of such a deal 
being successful.196 Some states have adopted the “arm of the tribe” doctrine, 
limiting when a tribe may properly assert tribal sovereign immunity.197 In gen-
eral, the arm of the tribe doctrine is a test used to determine whether a corpo-
rate affiliate or subagent of a Native American tribe is entitled to sovereign 
immunity as part of the tribe.198 
Because “arm of the tribe” doctrines have arisen out of state courts, the 
precise factors used to determine whether a corporate affiliate is an arm of the 
tribe varies by state.199 Though the tests differ, the factors used to determine 
whether an entity is an arm of the tribe tend to focus on the method of creation 
                                                                                                                           
million on slot revenue alone for the month of May 2017). See generally OBERG, supra note 180, at 133 
(describing the painful history of the Native Americans throughout the history of the United States). 
 195 See Furry, 685 F.3d at 1237 (implying that tribal immunity can leave a tort victim without a 
remedy despite the Tribe being a sophisticated business enterprise); Seneca, 253 P.3d at 55–56 (stat-
ing that tribal sovereign immunity left a party without remedy in a negligence action against a tribe); 
McCaskill to PhRMA: Are You Comfortable with Allergan’s Action with Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe?, 
supra note 185 (describing a need for congressional action as tribal immunity can create an “absurd 
loophole[]”). 
 196 See People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enter., 386 P.3d 357, 361 (Cal. 2016) (stating that in 
order to assert tribal sovereign immunity, the tribe-owned business must be an “arm of the tribe”); 
Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston Gold Course Corp., 25 N.E.3d 928, 929 (N.Y. 2014) 
(denying an assertion of tribal sovereign immunity because the business was not an “arm of the 
tribe”); CANBY, supra note 35, at 100 (implying that when a tribal business is not found to be an “arm 
of the tribe,” the business may not assert tribal immunity as a defense). 
 197 See Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Ariz. 1989) (utilizing an arm of the 
tribe analysis in Arizona); Owen, 386 P.3d at 366 (using the arm of the tribe doctrine in California); 
Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 935 (using an arm of the tribe test in New York); Brian L. Pierson, 
The Precarious Sovereign Immunity of Tribal Business Corporations, THE FED. L., Apr. 2015, at 58, 
59 (explaining different jurisdictional approaches to the “arm of the tribe” doctrine). 
 198 See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra note 23, § 7.3 (explaining that some 
courts will consider whether an entity is an arm of the tribe such that the entity can assert tribal im-
munity); see also Owen, 386 P.3d at 366 (stating that various jurisdictions have adopted arm of the 
tribe tests to determine when a subagent of a Native tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity); 
Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 935 (using an arm of the tribe test to determine whether a sub-
entity of an Indian tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity). 
 199 See Owen, 386 P.3d at 365 (using a five-factor arm of the tribe test); Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 
N.E.3d at 935 (applying a nine-factor test to determine if an entity was an arm of the tribe); Pierson, 
supra note 197, at 59 (explaining that although some jurisdictions use the “arm of the tribe” doctrine, 
the factors used by a court to determine “arm” status differ by jurisdiction). 
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of the entity, the entity’s purpose, the tribe’s control over the entity, and the 
financial relationship between the entity and the tribe.200 
The arm of the tribe doctrine can thus prevent unreasonable agreements 
between private entities and Native tribes where the entity seems to do busi-
ness with the tribe solely for the purpose of asserting the tribe’s sovereign im-
munity.201 For example, an outsider would not simply be able to sell part of a 
business to a Native tribe and gain the right to assert sovereign immunity.202 
Rather, the tribe would most likely have to own the entirety of the business as 
well as establish considerable financial connections between the tribe and the 
business.203 Although the arm of the tribe doctrine does not limit assertions of 
tribal immunity in all cases, it is one significant limitation and an important 
means to protect against abuses of tribal sovereign immunity.204 
C. Another Possible Solution: Public Policy 
Another possible solution to prevent outsider deals with tribes seeking to 
take advantage of tribal immunity was alluded to by the court in the Allergan 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Owen, 386 P.3d at 365 (stating that it is important to consider the scope of the relationship 
between the tribe and the entity, including the entity’s purpose and financial tie to the tribe); 
Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 932 (stating that both financial factors and non-financial factors 
should be considered in using the arm of the tribe test); Pierson, supra note 197, at 59 (describing 
similar factors considered by a court in exercising the arm of the tribe doctrine, yet explaining that the 
precise factors can differ). 
 201 Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 937 (finding that a golf course owned by an Indian tribe but 
operated as a separate entity did not qualify for sovereign immunity under the “arm of the tribe” test in 
a foreclosure lawsuit); Pierson, supra note 197, at 59 (stating that tribal entities may not always be 
able to assert tribal immunity based upon how tenuous a connection the entity has to the actual tribe). 
 202 See Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 935, 937 (illustrating that more than a mere monetary 
interest in a company is required to assert tribal immunity). Given the factors considered in applying 
arm of the tribe doctrines, merely selling a part of a business would not seem to satisfy enough fac-
tors, and therefore the doctrine would prevent a party in such a case from asserting sovereign immuni-
ty as if it were a tribe. See id. at 932 (stating that both financial and nonfinancial factors are important 
in determining whether an entity is considered a part of a tribe for the purposes of sovereign immuni-
ty); Pierson, supra note 197, at 59 (explaining that tribal sovereign immunity cannot always be assert-
ed, depending on the connection between the business entity and the tribe). 
 203 See Owen, 386 P.3d at 365–66 (finding that a relationship between a tribe and a business does 
not automatically grant the business the ability to assert sovereign immunity; to do so, the business 
must be considered an arm of the tribe); Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 932 (finding that an entity 
must have sufficient connections to the tribe in order to assert immunity as if it were the tribe). 
 204 See Owen, 386 P.3d at 365 (applying a five-factor test to determine whether a tribe-affiliated 
entity can assert tribal immunity); Sue/Perior Concrete, 25 N.E.3d at 935 (using an arm of the tribe 
test to determine whether a tribe-affiliated entity is entitled to assert sovereign immunity); CONFER-
ENCE OF WESTERN ATT’YS GEN., supra note 23, § 7.3 (stating that the arm of the tribe doctrine is 
used in some jurisdictions to determine whether an entity is can assert tribal immunity, and failure to 
be classified as an “arm of the tribe” will bar the entity from claiming immunity). 
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case.205 There, the court implied that the Allergan deal is contrary to public 
policy.206 If an agreement is contrary to public policy, a court can invalidate the 
agreement, or render any terms that are contrary to public policy invalid.207 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that an agreement may be 
unenforceable as against public policy if the interests of the public are out-
weighed by the interests furthered in enforcing the agreement and the harm 
that would result if the agreement was found to be unenforceable.208 
In Allergan, the court briefly stated that the agreement between Allergan 
and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe was an attempt to monetize the Tribe’s sover-
eign immunity, essentially renting immunity solely for the purpose of avoiding 
litigation.209 Because the underlying purpose of the transaction between the 
parties is seemingly to avoid legal responsibility, the transaction could be clas-
sified as contrary to public policy.210 That is, making an agreement purely for 
the purpose of avoiding legal action would be contrary to the public policy of 
having an effective judicial system in which individuals can seek a remedy.211 
If a court were to determine that the transaction was contrary to public policy 
and therefore unenforceable, the transaction could be reversed, preventing the 
private party from asserting tribal sovereign immunity as a defense.212 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at 
*3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (stating that the deal between Allergan and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe 
may be against public policy and therefore void). 
 206 Id. 
 207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that a 
court may invalidate provisions of an agreement when enforcing the provisions would be contrary to 
public policy); Mark Petit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 263, 298 (1999) (explaining that a court can declare a contract or a provision of a contract inva-
lid because it is against public policy); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) 
(stating that an agreement is not enforceable if enforcing it runs contrary to the interests of the public); 
Lang McLaughery Spera Real Estate, LLC. v. Hinsdale, 35 A.3d 100, 109 (Vt. 2011) (refusing to 
enforce certain provisions of a contract because the provisions were against public policy). 
 208 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts pro-
vides other factors that should also be weighed when determining if a court should find an agreement 
unenforceable, including whether the parties to the agreement engaged in any misconduct. Id. 
 209 See Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (stating that Allergan’s deal appears to be an attempt to 
rent the Tribe’s sovereign immunity as a means to escape review by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). 
 210 See Lang, 35 A.3d at 109 (finding that a provision of a contract was unenforceable because en-
forcing the provision would be contrary to public policy); Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (stating that 
the underlying purpose of the Allergan transaction was seemingly to avoid any legal responsibility). 
 211 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 714–15 (2013) (stating that the role of the judiciary 
is to provide relief to individuals with personal and particularized grievances); Neary v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 124 (Cal. 1992) (stating that the purpose of the judicial system is to re-
solve disputes). 
 212 See Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (implying that if the Allergan deal was found to be 
contrary to public policy, then any attempt by Allergan to assert tribal immunity in a lawsuit over the 
patents would not succeed). If an agreement as in the Allergan case was contrary to public policy, then 
a court could find the agreement unenforceable, revert ownership of the property to the original own-
er, and strip the party of any means to assert tribal immunity. See id; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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hough it may often times be difficult Reo determine the underlying purpose of 
an agreement, finding an agreement unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
provides another means by which a court can prevent outsiders from asserting 
tribal immunity.213 
If outsider deals continue to be used as a means to exploit tribal immuni-
ty, courts should feel comfortable invalidating these deals as a matter of public 
policy.214 Courts should not hesitate to determine that the interest to the public 
in compensating injured parties outweighs the interest in enforcing a mutually 
agreed upon contract that exploits tribal immunity.215 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court created the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity in which a Native Indian tribe can assert immunity from suit. Alt-
hough tribal immunity was created by the Supreme Court, the Court has re-
peatedly maintained that only Congress has the power to limit tribal immunity 
by enacting statutes. Although Congress has limited tribal immunity in certain 
circumstances, most notably in criminal cases, there remain numerous instanc-
es in which tribal immunity may be properly asserted, requiring that the claim 
against the tribe be dismissed even if the tribe is culpable. 
Allowing tribal sovereign immunity to exist in its current state has nega-
tively impacted the United States judicial system by relieving tribes from liabil-
ity even when the tribe would otherwise be liable. Consequently, injured parties 
are left without a remedy or any recourse in the United States judicial system. 
                                                                                                                           
CONTRACTS § 178 (stating that an agreement may be unenforceable if the agreement runs contrary to 
public policy). 
 213 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392 (finding that an agreement may be unenforceable when it runs 
contrary to public policy but failing to find that the agreement at issue was against public policy); 
Lang, 35 A.3d at 109 (refusing to enforce a provision in a contract because the provision was against 
public policy); Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (implying that a transaction between a non-tribal 
entity and a tribe as a means to assert tribal immunity would be contrary to public policy); RICHARD 
A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12.1 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2017) (stating that courts may 
invalidate contracts as against public policy, but there is uncertainty as to what constitutes an agree-
ment against public policy). 
 214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178 (stating that a contract may be invalid as 
a matter of public policy); Petit, supra note 207, at 298 (stating that courts can invalidate contracts if 
the contracts are contrary to public policy). 
 215 See Mayor & City Council v. Clark, 944 A.2d 1122, 1126 (Md. 2008) (asserting that courts 
are often reluctant to invalidate voluntary contracts); Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 547 (Mass. 
2007) (stating that courts are often hesitant to invalidate contracts because of public policy); Van 
Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 402 S.W.3d 915, 922 (Tex. App. 2013) (stating that when determin-
ing if a contract is unenforceable as against public policy, a court must weigh the interests of enforc-
ing the contract against the interests of the public); Lang, 35 A.3d at 109 (finding that public policy 
weighed in favor of finding the contract invalid); LORD, supra note 213, § 12.2 (explaining that it is 
unclear what types of agreements are against public policy, and courts can find new agreements to be 
against public policy when warranted). 
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Moreover, non-tribe members are capable of exploiting tribal sovereign immuni-
ty. By entering into favorable property transactions with a tribe, an individual 
can effectively rent a tribe’s immunity and avoid a lawsuit. In order to protect 
injured parties and close this loophole in the United States judicial system, Con-
gress needs to enact new legislation limiting tribal sovereign immunity. 
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